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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the concepts of "voting stock" and "voting power" are 
pervasive throughout the Code,1 until recently, courts, 
commentators and the Service have devoted minimal energy to 
demystifying the confusion surrounding the definition of voting 
stock and even less to expanding upon the methodology of 
computing voting power. Recent developments, however, may 
prompt practitioners to take a second look at these terms. While a 
1995 decision by the Tax Court adds little to the existing body of 
authority with respect to the determination of the owner of voting 
stock, the Service's analysis of the voting power requirement in a 
1994 private letter ruling sheds new light on the method of 
computing voting power. 
This article reviews and analyzes the current state of the law 
concerning the voting stock and voting power requirements in two 
areas of the tax law: section 368(c), which defines the level of stock 
ownership in a corporation that a taxpayer must possess in order 
to qualify for many forms of tax-free reorganizations, and section 
1504(a), which requires a corporation attempting to form an 
"affiliated group" with a subsidiary corporation to own an amount 
of voting stock in the subsidiary having a specified level of voting 
power. 
Part II of this article briefly explains the statutory requirements 
ofboth section 368(c) and section 1504(a). Part III reviews the case 
law and administrative precedents that have shaped the definition 
of voting stock and attempts to distinguish the ownership 
requirement of section 368(c) from the direct ownership 
requirement of section 1504(a). Accordingly, part III of this article 
Unless otherwise specified herein, all references to the Code or to a section of the Code 
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the regulations promulgated 
thereunder. All references to the Service are to the Internal Revenue Service. 
I 
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also analyzes the Tax Court's most recent decision regarding the 
meaning of the term "direct ownership." Part IV examines the 
mechanical test developed by the courts and the Service for 
computing the voting power inherent in the stock of a corporation, 
explores ways in which taxpayers have attempted to manipulate a 
corporation's capital structure in order to satisfy the control 
requirement of section 368(c), and discusses the Service's latest 
pronouncement regarding the use of this mechanical test in 
measuring voting power. Finally, this article highlights the 
remaining ambiguities that continue to create uncertainty for 
taxpayers with regard to the voting stock definition and the voting 
power formula.2 
II. SECTION 368(c) AND SECTION 1504(a) 
Many important tax considerations depend on whether a 
taxpayer3 owns the requisite percentage of the vote or equity value 
or both of another entity (generally, "control"). Under several 
provisions of the Code, this control requirement is satisfied where 
one taxpayer owns more than 50 percent of the equity interests in 
another taxpayer.4 Both the ability of corporations to file 
This article does not attempt to address the "solely for voting stock" requirement 
applicable to sections 368(a)(1)(B) and (C). The discussion herein analyzing the definition of 
voting stock, however, is extremely relevant to the analysis of whether a reorganization 
satisfies the "solely for voting stock" requirement of these sections. For an in-depth article 
discussing the "solely for voting stock" requirement, see Richard R. Dailey, The Voting Stock 
Requirements ofB and C Reorganizations,26 Tax L. Rev. 725 (1971). 
3 Depending on the context, the term "taxpayer," as used herein, may either refer to one 
individual or entity or to several individuals or entities acting together as a group. 
4 See I.R.C. § 267 (prohibiting a taxpayer from deducting either losses relating to the sale 
of property to a related party or interest or expenses incurred with respect to transactions 
with such related party. Many of the relationships defined in section 267 rely on a 50 percent 
value test.); I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(2)(C), (3)(C) (requiring a taxpayer to own 50 percent or more of 
the value of a corporation's stock in order for the attribution rules of section 318 to apply); 
I.R.C. § 269(a) (using a 50 percent vote or value standard in determining whether a party 
acquired control of another corporation for the purpose of evading or avoiding federal income 
tax); I.R.C. §§ 304(a), (c) (applying to transactions only if one or more persons is in control of 
each of two corporations and one of those corporations acquires stock of the other corporation 
from such person. Control, as used in this section, is defined as the ownership of 50 percent 
or more of either the vote or value of such corporations.); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (allowing a 
corporation to transfer its assets to another corporation in a tax-free reorganization if, 
immediately after the transfer, the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders, is in control 
of the corporation to which such assets were transferred). 
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consolidated returns5 and the ability of taxpayers to engage in tax-
free reorganizations,6 however, require one party to own at least 80 
percent of the stock of another corporation in order to satisfy the 
control requirements described in sections 368(c) and 1504(a). 
While the authorities that define the term voting stock and those 
that discuss the measurement ofvoting power under sections 368(c) 
and 1504(a) overlap in their discussions of such terms, the 
statutory requirements ofthese sections are quite different. Under 
section 368(c), control is defined as the ownership of stock 
possessing at least 80 percent ofthe total combined voting power of 
all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the 
total number of shares of all other classes of stock (i.e., non-voting 
stock) of the corporation.7 The section 368(c) definition of control 
5 I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a). 
6 See I.R.C. § 351 (providing that a contribution of property by one or more persons to a 
corporation in exchange for the stock of such corporation is a nontaxable transaction [i.e., no 
gain or loss is recognized] if immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in 
control of the corporation); I.R.C. § 355 (allowing a corporation to make a nontaxable 
distribution to its shareholders ofstock or securities ofa corporation it controls immediately 
prior to such distribution); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (giving a corporation the ability to acquire the 
stock of another corporation on a tax-free basis if such exchange is solely for the voting stock 
of the acquiring corporation [or a corporation that is in control of the acquiring corporation] 
and the acquiring corporation is in control of the other corporation immediately after the 
acquisition); I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(2)(D), (E) (allowing for tax-free subsidiary reorganizations). In 
each case, the applicable Code section relies on the definition of control in I.R.C. § 368(c). 
7 The requirement that a party own at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of 
non-voting stock of another corporation has been interpreted to mean that such party must 
own at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of eachclass of non-voting stock of the 
controlled corporation. See Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115. There, the Service stated that 
"[tihe legislative history of section 368(c) of the Code indicates a congressional intent that 
ownership of each class of non-voting stock is required." Id. at 116. The Service discussed 
the importance of looking to the ownership of a specified percentage of each class of non-
voting stock as opposed to the ownership of the total number of non-voting shares: 
Moreover, percentage ownership of the number of non-voting shares outstanding, as 
contrasted to percentage ownership of each class of non-voting shares, is ordinarily of 
no significance and can lead to results which are inconsistent with the statutory scheme 
and clear congressional purpose. Ownership of large numbers ofnon-voting shares in 
a multi-class stock structure would not necessarily assure, in itself, the continuation of 
substantial proprietary interests in modified corporate form as contemplated by the 
statute. 
Id. 
The Service has consistently held to this view of the definition of the term "all other 
classes of stock of the corporation." See Rev. Proc. 83-59, 1983-2 C.B. 575 (requiring that a 
taxpayer be "in control" of a transferee corporation within the meaning of section 368(c) and 
Revenue Ruling 59-259 before the Service will issue the taxpayer a private letter ruling that 
a transaction qualifies under section 351 or 355). See also P.L.R. 89-48-001 (July 21, 1989); 
P.L.R. 77-47-106 (Aug. 29, 1977); G.C.M. 39,264 (July 23, 1982); G.C.M. 34,122 (May 8, 1969); 
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does not, however, require that a shareholder own stock that 
participates in corporate growth (i.e., common stock) or that 
represents a certain percentage of the equity value of the 
corporation. Thus, for purposes of section 368(c), both non-voting 
preferred stock and "enhanced voting stock"' issued by a 
corporation are included in determining whether the control test is 
satisfied. 
Section 1504(a) defines control differently. Corporations are 
members of the same affiliated group only if a common parent owns 
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total voting power and 
representing at least 80 percent of the value of all of the stock of 
each corporation.9 Unlike section 368(c), section 1504(a) generally 
ignores the existence of non-voting preferred stock in determining 
whether its requirements are satisfied." Furthermore, because 
section 1504 uses both a vote and value test to determine 
affiliation, taxpayers have little ability to restructure the capital 
stock of a corporation (through, for example, the issuance of 
enhanced voting stock) in order to satisfy the voting requirements 
of section 1504(a).'1 On the other hand, the fact that the section 
G.C.M. 33,712 (Dec. 21, 1967). 
8 Enhanced voting stock refers to stock issued by a corporation that possesses a greater 
number ofvotes per share than its underlying equity represents. For example, a corporation 
may issue two classes of common stock each representing 50 percent of the equity of such 
corporation. While a holder of shares of the first class ofcommon stock has the ability to cast 
one vote in the election of directors (or other matters on which shareholders have the right 
to vote), a holder of shares of the second class of common stock may have the ability to cast 
multiple votes on the same issue. If, however, the vote-to-value ratio of one class ofstock as 
compared to other classes of stock of the corporation is either too high or too low, the Service 
may inquire as to whether such stock is truly voting stock. See infra part IV.B.2.c. 
9 I.R.C. §§ 1504(a)(1), (2). 
10 Section 1504(a)(4) carves out from the definition of "stock" any stock which (i) is not 
entitled to vote, (ii) is limited and preferred as to dividends and does not participate in 
corporate growth to any significant extent, (iii) has redemption and liquidation rights which 
do not exceed the issue price ofsuch stock (except for a reasonable redemption or liquidation 
premium), and (iv) is not convertible into another class of stock. Such stock is sometimes 
referred to as "plain, vanilla preferred stock." 
" For tax years prior to 1985, the affiliated group requirement of section 1504(a) was 
satisfied if, as with section 368(c), one corporation possessed ownership of 80 percent of the 
voting power of all classes of stock and at least 80 percent of each class of non-voting stock. 
This requirement was changed by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (the "1984 Tax Act") 
because ofa concern that corporations were taking advantage of the benefits of consolidation 
even though they did not have a sufficient economic stake in their subsidiaries: 
The law is generally intended to permit two corporations to file a consolidated return if 
one corporation owns and controls at least 80 percent of the other. Unfortunately, the 
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368(c) definition of control is based primarily on the voting power 
that a taxpayer holds in a corporation gives taxpayers a great deal 
of flexibility in structuring a transaction in order to satisfy such 
control requirement.12 
III. DEFINITION OF VOTING STOCK 
A. Ability to Elect Directors 
Although the statutory definition of control in section 368(c) 
differs from the statutory requirements of stock ownership for 
corporations to file consolidated returns under sections 1501 and 
1504, the precedents that define voting stock and measure voting 
power under each of these sections are interrelated.13 Thus, one 
could infer that the courts and the Service have determined that 
the section 368(c) "80 percent ofthe total combined voting power of 
all classes of stock entitled to vote" standard and the section 
1504(a)(2) "80 percent ofthe total voting power of such corporation" 
standard, have the same meaning despite slightly different 
phrasing. 
law, as written, is more generous than that. Taxpayers have been using creative capital 
structures so as to be eligible for consolidation in situations not appropriate for 
consolidation and to avoid consolidation in situations when it should not be avoided. 
Taxpayers have been filing consolidated returns in situations where one owns less than 
30 percent in value of the other. As a result, corporations with substantial taxable 
incomes have been taking advantage of the consolidated return rules to use tax losses 
of the other corporation. In essence, the former are buying tax losses of the latter. 
Senate floor amendment to H.R. 2163, 130 Cong. Rec. 8654 (Apr. 11, 1984). 
It is presumed, however, that the amendments to section 1504 pursuant to the 1984 Tax 
Act do not impose on a corporation the requirement that the voting power and value of its 
stock be proportionate as such result would make the 80 percent vote and value tests 
redundant. See The New York State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on 
Corporations, Report on Tax Reform Act of 1984 Amendments to Section 1504(a), The 
Definitionof Affiliated Group," 28 Tax Notes (TA) 895, 911 (Aug. 19, 1985). Thus, while a 
corporation that has a class of enhanced voting stock may satisfy the voting power 
requirement of section 1504(a)(2)(A), there is limited ability to use such stock to satisfy 
section 1504(a)'s stock ownership requirement. 
12 See infra part IV for examples of restructurings made prior to a tax-free transaction in 
order to satisfy the section 368(c) control requirement. 
" See, e.g., G.C.M. 38,951 (Jan. 17, 1983) (describing the requirement of section 1504(a) 
prior to 1985 as "functionally equivalent to the control requirement under section 368(c)"). 
See also G.C.M. 35,633 (Jan. 23, 1974); G.C.M. 34,979 (Aug. 8, 1972); G.C.M. 34,795 (Mar. 1, 
1972); G.C.M. 31,020 (Dec. 5, 1958). But see supra text accompanying note 55. 
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Voting stock has been defined by both judicial and 
administrative authorities as stock having the power to vote for 
directors who control the management of the corporation.14 These 
authorities have held that this power alone determines whether 
stock is to be considered voting stock for purposes of both section 
368(c) and section 1504(a). 
In Income Tax Ruling 3896, the Service determined that a 
shareholder that owned 100 percent of the common stock and 55.5 
percent ofthe preferred stock of a subsidiary corporation could not 
consolidate with the subsidiary. 5 In reaching its conclusion, the 
Service held that preferred stock that entitled its holders to elect 
one of the corporation's seven directors was voting stock, even 
though the stock had only limited ability to vote on other matters. 
The Service stated that "[i]t is the opinion of this office, therefore, 
that any stock which participates in the election of directors is 
voting stock within the intendment of section 141(d) of the Code."' 6 
Ownership of a portion of the preferred stock by parties unrelated 
to the taxpayer prevented consolidation from occurring. 
In Revenue Ruling 69-126, the Service ruled that preferred stock 
that had no voting power other than the ability to elect three out of 
eight directors of a corporation was voting stock for purposes of 
14 The case most often cited for this proposition is Erie LightingCo. v. Commissioner,93 
F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1937). In Erie,however, the court never affirmatively defines voting stock; 
instead, it defines what is not voting stock for purposes of section 240(d) of the Revenue Act 
of 1926 or section 142(c) of the Revenue Act of 1928 (the predecessors to section 1504(a)). The 
court, citing Schlafly v. United States, 4 F.2d 195, 200 (8th Cir. 1925), stated that "[t]he 
Commissioner and the Board [of Tax Appeals] and the courts, however, prior to 1926, 
consistently construed these acts to mean that preferred stock not having the right to vote 
for directors was not voting stock.'" Erie,93 F.2d at 884. See also Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. 
Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 443, 448-49 (1933), affd, 81 F.2d 971, 974 (6th Cir. 1936), cert. 
denied, 298 U.S. 676 (1936), and Vermont Hydro-ElectricCorp. v. Commissioner,29 B.T.A. 
1006, 1011 (1934), which also define the term voting stock by negative inference. 
11 1948-1 C.B. 72. Although Income Tax Ruling 3896 was not specifically revoked or 
superseded, it was declared obsolete by the Service in Revenue Ruling 68-100, 1968-1 C.B. 
572. The principles announced therein, however, have been consistently applied in 
determining whether stock issued by a corporation is voting stock and in determining the 
voting power inherent in a corporation's stock. 
" I.T. 3896, 1948-1 C.B. at 74. Section 141(d), the predecessor to section 1504, required 
that one corporation own at least 95 percent of the voting power of all classes ofstock and 95 
percent of each class of the non-voting stock, excluding non-voting stock that is limited and 
preferred as to dividends, of another corporation in order for such corporations to be 
affiliated. I.R.C. § 141(d) (1939). 
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section 1504(a). 7 In its ruling, the Service relied on Rudolph 
Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner,which held that preferred stock that 
had the right to vote only for directors was voting stock within the 
meaning of section 141(d).'8 The Service held that "since the 
preferred stock in the instant case participates in the election of 
directors, it is voting stock for purposes of section 1504(a) of the 
Code."'9 Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 63-234,20 the Service ruled 
that a class of preferred stock was voting stock for purposes of 
section 368(a)(1)(B) since it had the right to elect (as a class) two of 
the corporation's twelve directors.2' 
B. CurrentAbility to Vote 
The authorities under sections 368(c) and 1504(a) have also held 
that only stock with the currentability to vote for directors qualifies 
as voting stock. For example, in Rudolph Wurlitzer, the court held 
that preferred stock which, by its terms, lacked the ability to vote 
unless dividends payable upon such stock were in arrears for more 
than one year, was voting stock for purposes of the consolidated 
return provisions of the Code. There, the court held that the voting 
restrictions imprinted on the preferred stock certificates were 
unconstitutional and, accordingly, regardless of whether the 
preferred stockholders actually voted their shares, they had the 
right to vote their stock had they chosen to do so.22 
Similarly, in ErieLighting,the First Circuit held that preferred 
stock was not voting stock for purposes ofdetermining whether the 
taxpayer and its parent were members of the same affiliated group 
where the preferred stock had no power to vote in any election for 
directors unless the dividends on the stock remained unpaid for two 
:7 1969-1 C.B. 218. 
' 29 B.T.A. 443 (1933), affd, 81 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,298 U.S. 676 (1936). 
19 Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. at 218. 
20 Rev. Rul. 63-234, 1963-2 C.B. 148. 
21 The transaction in Revenue Ruling 63-234, however, failed to qualify as a tax-free 
reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B) as the Service held that the receipt of the voting 
preferred stock at issue was "transitory and without real substance" when the transaction 
was treated as one of two steps in a prearranged plan. Rev. Rul. 63-234, 1963-2 C.B. at 149. 
22 Rudolph Wurlitzer, 29 B.T.A. at 449. 
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quarters.23 The court noted that "[i]t is admitted that the 
conditions have not arisen that give the preferred stock in this 
corporation a right to participate in the election of directors."24 The 
court in Erie Lighting relied, in part, on the decision in Vermont 
Hydro-ElectricCorp. v. Commissioner,25 where the court similarly 
determined that preferred stock that had the ability to vote only if 
the issuing corporation was in default in the payment of dividends 
for four consecutive quarters was not voting stock for a period 
where the corporation was not in default. In so holding the court 
stated: 
The definitions of affiliation and of "stock" given in this section 
were designed, we believe, to establish a definite inflexible 
standard, to remove the uncertainties and obviate the variables 
constantly impeding efficient administration of prior statutes 
governing affiliation .... We think that for any period under 
this statute during which a claim for affiliation is not predicated 
on ownership of at least 95 percent of the actual outstanding 
voting stock, the claim must fail.26 
In Revenue Ruling 72-72,27 the Service held that acquiring 
corporation stock received in a reorganization by the shareholders 
of the target corporation was not voting stock for purposes of 
section 368(a)(1)(B) where such stock, by its terms, lacked the 
ability to vote for five years. There, X, a corporation wholly owned 
by individual A, desired to acquire all of the stock of corporation Y 
in exchange for X voting stock. Issuance of a sufficient amount of 
" Technically, in Erie Lighting, the court held that the preferred stock at issue was not 
stock for purposes of determining consolidation because it was non-voting preferred stock. 
Erie LightingCo. v. Commissioner,93 F.2d 883, 884 (1st Cir. 1937). 
24 Erie Lighting,93 F.2d at 885. 
25 29 B.T.A. 1006 (1934). 
26 Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1006, 1010-11 (1934) 
(emphasis added). See PantlindHotel Co. v. Commissioner,23 B.T.A. 1207, 1210-11 (1931) 
(A corporation's preferred stock, which lacked the ability to vote except for such times as any 
dividends on the preferred stock remained unpaid for sixty days, was voting stock where the 
issuer of such stock was almost seventeen months in arrears in paying dividends. As a result, 
a taxpayer that owned almost all of the common stock but less than 25 percent of the 
preferred stock of the corporation was unable to file a consolidated return with the 
corporation for the taxable period involved.). 
27 1972-1 C.B. 104. 
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X voting stock would have required A to relinquish voting control 
ofX to the Y shareholders. In order to retain control of X, however, 
X and the Y shareholders agreed thatA would retain an irrevocable 
right to vote the X stock received by the Y shareholders for five 
years. The voting restriction imposed by this arrangement was 
imprinted on the stock certificates received by the Y shareholders 
and was binding on all future recipients of the stock. After five 
years, any holder of such stock would be able to vote its stock 
without restriction. In concluding that the X stock received by the 
Y shareholders was not voting stock, the Service stated that: 
The arrangement prevented the shareholders of Y from voting 
their X stock on their own behalf for a period of five years and 
perpetuated A's voting control over all of the outstanding stock 
ofX. Such an arrangement is the same as ifX issued non-voting 
common stock that automatically converted to voting common 
stock after five years. In either case the X stock is not "voting 
stock" within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code. 
28 
C. Ability of Shareholderto Vote Shares 
1. Section 368(c) 
If voting rights are inherent in the stock of a corporation, then 
such stock is treated as voting stock for purposes of section 368(c) 
regardless of whether the particular shareholder owning the stock 
actually has the legal right to vote its shares. In Revenue Ruling 
73-28,29 the Service held that a reorganization qualified under 
section 368(a)(1)(B) even though the recipient of voting stock could 
not, under state law, exercise the power to vote such shares. There, 
Corporation X owned all of the stock of Corporation Y which owned 
all of the stock of Corporation Z. X desired to own directly all of the 
stock of Z, and X acquired the Z stock from Y in exchange for X 
stock. Because, however, Y was a subsidiary of X, state law 
prevented Y from voting the X stock. The Service concluded that 
28 Id. 
1973-1 C.B. 187. 
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the X stock constituted voting stock notwithstanding Ys inability 
to vote such stock. 
In General Counsel Memorandum 34,979,30 the Service clarified 
what appeared to be a contradiction between its characterization of 
the stock in Revenue Ruling 73-28 as voting stock and the stock in 
Revenue Ruling 72-72 as non-voting stock. The memorandum 
explained the different results by distinguishing between voting 
restrictions inherent in the stock and voting restrictions personal 
to the shareholder. Where voting restrictions are inherent in the 
stock, such stock should be characterized as non-voting stock. 
Where such restrictions only affect a particular shareholder, the 
stock retains its voting character. 
According to General Counsel Memorandum 34,979, the Service 
appears to have based its conclusion in Revenue Ruling 72-72 on 
the holdings in Erie Lighting and Vermont Hydro-ElectricCorp., 
since both the courts and the Service focused their inquiry on "the 
effect ofthe particular arrangement upon the character of the stock 
issued rather than upon the capacity of the shareholder who 
received the shares in question."31 In Revenue Ruling 73-28, 
however, the inability to vote the stock was not a characteristic of 
the stock generally; rather, it was particular to one shareholder. 
Thus, the Service stated that: 
If under the provisions contained in the share certificates or 
under a collateral contractual arrangement any shareholder who 
received such stock would be absolutely prohibited for a fixed 
period of time from voting the shares received, such stock is 
clearly not "voting stock." 
Insofar as the shares of stock involved in the instant case are 
concerned, the share certificates were invested with full voting 
rights upon receipt by the subsidiary corporation. No conditions 
or contingencies were attached to the share certificates nor to 
any collateral arrangement that would have the effect of limiting 
or altering the voting privileges conveyed to an owner of the 
30 Aug. 8, 1972. 
31 G.C.M. 34,979. Revenue Ruling 72-72 cited no authority for its conclusion. The view of 
the Chief Counsel's Office that such decision relies upon these authorities appears to be 
correct. 
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parent's stock. In the hands of any other stockholder except a 
subsidiary of the issuing corporation such shares would be 
unconditionally voteable.32 
2. Section 1504(a) 
Where a subsidiary owns stock issued by its parent and the 
subsidiary is unable to vote the stock, the issue is different under 
section 1504(a). Since the consolidated return provisions of the 
Code inquire as to whether one corporation owns the requisite 
amount of stock in another corporation to file a consolidated return, 
the issue is whether the stock owned by the subsidiary should be 
counted in determining whether another party owning stock in the 
parent satisfies the ownership requirements of section 1504(a). 
According to the Service, such stock should not be counted for this 
purpose. 
In General Counsel Memorandum 38,422, 33 the Service 
determined that a parent corporation satisfied the voting power 
requirement of section 1504(a)(2) where it owned 68 percent of the 
voting stock of a subsidiary, since the subsidiary's remaining voting 
stock was held by a lower-tier subsidiary. The holding in General 
Counsel Memorandum 38,422 was based on a prior administrative 
memorandum that concluded that the stock ofa corporation held by 
its subsidiary should be treated as the equivalent of treasury stock 
in determining the voting rights of the stock of the corporation.34 
Even though such stock is not treated as voting stock in 
determining the voting power of the corporation, "the controlling 
state law does not convert the stock into a class of 'non-voting stock' 
under section 1504(a)(2)."35 The stock, therefore, should merely be 
disregarded when applying the affiliation test of section 1504(a).36 
3 G.C.M. 34,979. 
" June 25, 1980. 
See G.C.M. 34,979; O.M. 18,715 (Nov. 2, 1976). In General Counsel Memorandum 
34,979, the Chief Counsel's Office stated that without more evidence it would not treat shares 
of a parent corporation held by a subsidiary as representing treasury shares or as in any way 
identical to canceled or unissued shares of the parent corporation, except that the shares 
could be treated as treasury shares with respect to voting rights. 
" See G.C.M. 34,979; G.C.M. 38,422; O.M. 18,715. 
" General Counsel Memorandum 38,422 also discusses the inconsistency that appears to 
arise when comparing its holding with Revenue Ruling 73-28, which, as discussed above, 
1997] Definitionof Voting Stock 115 
D. Voting Trusts and Voting Agreements 
1. Section 368(c) 
The characterization of stock as voting stock generally looks to 
the inherent characteristics of the stock and is unaffected by 
agreements or arrangements made by the corporation's 
shareholders. The earliest authority for such statement is General 
Counsel Memorandum 2177,37 in which the Service concluded that 
the type of ownership required to satisfy the control test is 
beneficial ownership of stock, regardless of who had the ability to 
vote the stock. There, a taxpayer was found to be the beneficial 
owner of stock even though the stock was placed into a trust that 
vested voting authority in court-appointed trustees. 
analyzes a similar issue under section 368(c). Such inconsistency arises because the "solely 
for voting stock" requirement of section 368 focuses on the nature of the consideration 
received by shareholders in a reorganization and attempts to tax transactions that technically 
fall under the reorganization provisions but are in effect sales (e.g., where non-voting 
preferred stock is issued), whereas section 1504(a) reflects the need for a "parent corporation 
to have voting control (through the right to elect directors) over.its subsidiary. Accordingly, 
since section 1504(a)(2) is concerned with actual and exercisable voting power and [section 
368] is not, the terms 'voting power' and 'voting stock' used in these sections are ... 
distinguishable." 
In spite of General Counsel Memorandum 38,422, one commentator suggests that the 
treatment of stock of an issuer held by its subsidiary for purposes of section 1504(a) remains 
unclear. See 1 Herbert J. Lerner, et al., Federal Income Taxation of Corporations Filing 
Consolidated Returns § 2.03[3] (1996). Lerner cites Revenue Ruling 58-308, 1958-1 C.B. 211, 
which relates to the affiliation requirements with respect to the grant of a pre-1964 restricted 
stock option. Lerner §2.03[3] at 2-42. In Revenue Ruling 58-308, the Service stated that if 
state law prohibits a subsidiary from voting stock that it owns in its parent corporation, such 
stock must be disregarded in determining whether the voting power tests of sections 425(e) 
and () are satisfied. Id. According to Lerner, however, the ruling does not address the issue 
of whether such stock is to be treated as treasury stock. Although Lerner expresses concern 
over whether Revenue Ruling 58-308 can be extended to the consolidated return area, he 
states that several other commentators generally agree that it does apply to the consolidated 
return area. Id. (citing, e.g., 1 Fred W. Peel, Jr., et al., Consolidated Tax Returns § 4.08 at 
46 (3d ed.)). 
37 VI-2 C.B. 112 (1927). At the time General Counsel Memorandum 2177 was issued, 
control was defined as ownership of at least 80 percent of the voting stock and at least 80 
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation. See 
Revenue Act of 1924 § 203(i) (the predecessor to section 368(c)). Although the definition of 
control has been altered slightly since 1924, the analysis provided in General Counsel 
Memorandum 2177 continues to represent the Service's position on the level of control 
required by section 368(c). 
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In FederalGrain Corp. v. Commissioner," acquiring corporation 
stock received by shareholders of the target corporation pursuant 
to a plan of reorganization was found to be voting stock. 
Accordingly, the target corporation's shareholders were determined 
to be in control of the acquiring corporation following the 
transaction even though the stock received by the shareholders was 
transferred to a trustee who had both the ability to vote the stock 
and an option to purchase such stock for five years.39 The court 
held that the term "control" related solely to ownership and bore no 
relationship to the actual control that the shareholders had over 
the corporation. Since such shareholders enjoyed all of the fruits 
of ownership, except possibly the right to possession of the stock 
certificates and the right to vote for a period of five years, they were 
in control of the corporation within the meaning of the statute.6° 
In General Counsel Memorandum 35,633,41 the Service analyzed 
the applicability of sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 355 to a 
reorganization and subsequent distribution of voting trust 
participation certificates. Pursuant to an antitrust decree, the 
taxpayer proposed to transfer assets relating to one of its 
businesses to a newly formed corporation, sell up to 20 percent of 
the new corporation's stock, place the remaining shares into a five-
year voting trust and distribute the participation certificates 
received from the trust to its shareholders on a pro rata basis. The 
Chief Counsel's Office stated that, based on precedent, 2 it would 
38 18 B.T.A. 242 (1929). 
11 Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-72, 1972-1 C.B. 104, in which the voting rights associated with acquiring 
corporation stock issued in a reorganization were retained by the sole shareholder of the 
corporation prior to the reorganization. 
40 FederalGrainCorp., 18 B.T.A. at 248. 
41 Jan. 23, 1974. G.C.M. 35,633 considers issues raised by the facts of Revenue Ruling 78-
442, 1978-2 C.B. 143. 
42 The Service based its conclusion on a March 27, 1968, advisory letter in which the 
Service ruled that a plan of divestiture "substantially similar" to the one before it would 
qualify under sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 355. In that advisory letter, the Service relied on 
General Counsel Memorandum 2177, in which it concluded that a court-ordered spin-off 
effected through the use of a voting trust qualified under sections 203(c) and 203(h)(1)(B) of 
the Revenue Act of 1924. There, as in Revenue Ruling 78-442, "the shareholders of the 
distributing corporation received certificates of interest in the controlled corporation and 
could not acquire stock of the controlled corporation from the trust unless they no longer 
owned shares of the distributing corporation." 
Furthermore, the Service noted that, in issuing its March 27, 1968, advisory letter, it 
had considered Federal Grain Corp., 18 B.T.A. 242 (1929); Peabody Hotel Co. v. 
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not be justified in ruling adversely to the taxpayer; however, it 
recommended a reappraisal as to whether the use of a voting trust 
that separated beneficial interest from voting rights would violate 
the statutory control requirements of sections 355 and 368(c).' The 
Service, however, has never reversed its position.44 
Commissioner,7 T.C. 600 (1946) (the control requirement of section 113(a)(7) of the Revenue 
Act of 1934 [the predecessor to section 368(c)] was satisfied with beneficial ownership); and 
NationalBellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner,20 T.C. 636 (1953), affd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 
1955) (reaching the same conclusion under section 112(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1939). 
9 General Counsel Memorandum 35,633 concluded that, because of certain 
inconsistencies, the issue of whether the holder ofvoting trust certificates could continue to 
be in control (within the meaning of section 368(c)) of the corporation whose stock was held 
in trust needed to be reappraised. The Service believed that Revenue Ruling 72-72 created 
an inconsistency between the view that section 368(c) focuses solely on the ownership of the 
stock (as expressed in General Counsel Memorandum 2177 and FederalGrain Corp.) and the 
view that section 368(c) focuses on the nature of the stock at issue (the interpretation of 
Revenue Ruling 72-72 expressed in General Counsel Memorandum 35,633). However, 
because both sets of authorities focus on the inherent nature of the stock as voting or non-
voting stock and not on whether a particular shareholder has the ability to vote such stock, 
these positions appear to be consistent. 
Moreover, the Service believed that the ability to satisfy the control requirement of 
section 368(c) by distributing certificates in a voting trust was inconsistent with the law 
under section 1504(a) since voting stock has been defined under section 1504(a) as stock that 
has the power to elect directors and such definition has been held to apply equally in defining 
voting stock under section 368(c). See G.C.M. 34,795 (Mar. 1, 1972); G.C.M. 31,020 (Dec. 5, 
1958). The author does not believe that the issuance of General Counsel Memorandum 
35,633 leads to such an inconsistency. That the owners of certificates of beneficial interest 
in a trust holding the voting stock of a corporation do not have the right to vote the shares 
does not affect the conclusion that such shares have the inherent ability to vote on issues 
affecting the management of the corporation (either directly or through the election of the 
board ofdirectors ofthe corporation). What the separation of the ownership of the stock and 
the right to vote the stock through the use of a voting trust does affect, however, is the ability 
to treat the owner of the stock as the "direct owner" of the stock for purposes of section 
1504(a). See infra part III.D.2. The distinction between the requirement that a taxpayer 
receive voting stock and that a taxpayer has the ability to vote the stock it owns is a 
fundamental difference between the purposes of sections 368(c) and 1504(a). See supranote 
36. 
4 Both the Service and the courts do, however, recognize the general principle that the 
right to vote stock is one of the characteristics ofstock ownership. For example, in General 
Counsel Memorandum 38,951 (Jan. 17, 1983), the Chief Counsel's Office concluded that the 
transfer of assets by one corporation to two of its subsidiaries qualified for nonrecognition 
treatment under section 351 even though the stock ofthe subsidiaries held by the transferor 
corporation was pledged to creditors pursuant to a plan ofbankruptcy reorganization. There, 
the Service stated that "pledged stock is considered the property of the pledgor rather than 
the pledgee if the pledgor retains the incidents of stock ownership such as the right to vote 
and to receive dividends." Id., citing Pauly v. StateLoan and Trust Co., 165 U.S. 606, 621-24 
(1897) and BlairHoldingsCorp. v. Bay City Bank & Trust Co., 234 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1956). 
The Service's conclusion in General Counsel Memorandum 38,951 relied on the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959), where, in a 
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In Revenue Ruling 75-95,45 issued the year following General 
Counsel Memorandum 35,633, the Service held that the continuity 
of interest requirement of section 368 was satisfied where the two 
shareholders of a corporation transferred the corporation's voting 
stock to a voting trust in exchange for trust certificates. Although 
the trustee held both legal title and exclusive voting rights to the 
stock, the shareholders were considered the owners of the stock 
since they retained the right to all dividends from the corporation 
and to receive their shares following the termination of the trust. 
In Private Letter Ruling 86-49-011,46 the Service ruled that a 
transaction qualified as a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B) 
even though contemporaneously with the reorganization certain 
shareholders of the target corporation agreed for three years 
following the transaction to vote any shares of acquiring 
corporation stock owned by them for a slate of directors designated 
by the management of the acquiring corporation. Implicit in the 
Service's decision was the conclusion that the stock received in the 
reorganization constituted voting stock notwithstanding the 
contemporaneous voting agreement. Private Letter Ruling 86-49-
011 cites to Revenue Ruling 73-28 and Revenue Ruling 72-72 in 
reaching this conclusion. 
transaction attempting to qualify under sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 355, a corporation 
transferred assets to a newly-formed subsidiary and distributed the stock of such subsidiary 
to its sole shareholder. Subsequently, the shareholder placed 60 percent of the subsidiary's 
stock into escrow as security for a support agreement with his former wife. The Service 
argued that the transaction did not qualify as a tax-free reorganization because the 
shareholder was not in control of the subsidiary within the meaning of section 112(g)(1) (the 
predecessor to section 368(a)(1)(D)) following transfer of the stock into escrow. The court 
disagreed, stating that: 
Allthe while, however, petitioner was the record owner. He reserved the right to vote 
the stock .... He would be entitled to all dividends on the stock. Indeed, the stock 
remained subject to a pledge for his own debt. Upon his death, semble, the stock would 
be liable to his creditors' claims. We find he was still in such control of the stock-and 
there was such a "continuity of interest"-as section 112(g)(1) demanded. 
Bondy, 269 F.2d at 467. 
46 1975-1 C.B. 114. 
46 Sept. 4, 1986. 
47 The ability to vote the stock received by the shareholders of the target corporation in 
Private Letter Ruling 86-49-011 was restricted only in the hands of the shareholders that 
entered into the shareholders agreement. Stock ofthe same class received by shareholders 
that did not enter into any separate agreement was entitled to full voting rights in the 
acquiring corporation. The restrictions imposed by the shareholders agreement were 
terminated when the stock was transferred to an unrelated party. Thus, while the inability 
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Finally, in Private Letter Ruling 91-24-061, 4" the Service held 
that an agreement by a private foundation not to vote stock it held 
did not convert the stock into non-voting stock that would be 
treated as permitted holdings for purposes of section 4943. 
Although the term "voting stock" in section 4943 is not defined by 
reference to section 368(c)'s definition of control, the Service relied, 
in part, on Revenue Rulings 72-72 and 73-28 in concluding that 
"whether stock is or is not voting stock generally depends upon 
inherent characteristics of the stock rather than upon such 
extraneous factors as a shareholders agreement."
49 
2. Section 1504(a) 
For purposes of section 1504(a), the use of an arrangement such 
as a voting trust to separate beneficial ownership from the right to 
vote shares does not transform the shares into non-voting stock: 
For purposes of determining 'affiliation' under the consolidated 
return provisions [of the Code], the existence of certain types of 
limited arrangements such as the transfer of shares to a voting 
trust or an escrow arrangement resulting in the suspension of 
voting privileges with respect to the beneficial owners of the 
stock have been held not to change the character ofthe shares to 
non-voting stock.5° 
In Kansas, Oklahoma & GulfRailway Company v. Helvering,M 
the court determined that stock of a subsidiary held in a voting 
trust and represented by unsurrendered trust certificates was 
outstanding voting stock for purposes of the predecessor of section 
1504(a), and, accordingly, the parent corporation was unable to 
consolidate with such subsidiary. Even though the holders of the 
to vote the stock in Revenue Ruling 72-72 was an inherent characteristic of such stock, the 
voting restrictions imposed in Private Letter Ruling 86-49-011 were personal to a particular 
set of shareholders, similar to the restrictions imposed by state law in Revenue Ruling 73-28. 
See supratext accompanying notes 29-32. 
"' Mar. 22, 1991. 
49 G.C.M. 39,855 (July 19, 1991). General Counsel Memorandum 39,855 is the Service's 
support for Private Letter Ruling 91-24-061 (Mar. 22, 1991). 
'0 G.C.M. 34,979 (Aug. 8, 1972). 
51 124 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1940). 
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trust certificates were unable to vote the underlying stock, the stock 
was endowed with the power to vote regardless of whether such 
stock was actually voted.52 
Similarly, in StandardLumber Co. v. Commissioner,53 the court 
concluded that stock held in a voting trust constituted voting stock 
despite the taxpayer's argument that subsequent state law 
invalidating future trusts had suspended the voting rights of the 
stock held in the voting trust. In StandardLumber, a trust with a 
term of 20 years was formed in 1952 to hold 25 percent of the stock 
of a corporation. The taxpayer, which owned 62 percent of the 
corporation's stock, argued that it held 82 percent (62 percent 
divided by the 75 percent of the corporation's stock not held in 
trust) of the corporation's outstanding voting stock during the 
period at issue (1954). Relying on a state statute (effective 
December 31, 1953) prohibiting the creation of voting trusts with 
a term greater than ten years, the taxpayer argued that the statute 
invalidated the trustees' right to vote the stock. Thus, according to 
the taxpayer, the certificate holders could not vote the stock until 
the stock had been reissued in their names, which did not occur 
until the trust was terminated in 1955.54 The court disagreed and 
held that the statute could not invalidate the trustees' voting rights 
absent retroactive application of the law, which could not be made 
without clear evidence that the legislature intended such 
application of the statute. 
While section 368(c) focuses on the nature ofthe interest received 
by a shareholder rather than on the shareholder's ability to vote 
such interest, section 1504(a) is concerned with a parent's ability to 
have voting control over its subsidiaries. Thus, while section 368(c) 
requires that one party simply own the voting stock of another, 
section 1504(a) requires a parent to have direct ownership and 
52 Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d at 464. 
53 35 T.C. 192 (1960), affd, 299 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1962) acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5. 
The taxpayer's brief to the Court stated its position as follows: 
Pending judicial clarification of the impact of this statutory provision upon a pre-
existing voting trust, the voting trustees could not validly exercise their voting rights 
under the voting trust. Neither could the voting trust certificate holders exercise same 
until the stock was issued in their names. In the absence of a judicial determination, 
the matter could be resolved only through a mutual termination of the voting trust 
agreement. 
35 T.C. at 197 (emphasis in original). 
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actual and exercisable voting power over the stock of its 
subsidiaries.55 The issue under section 1504(a) is whether the 
owner of voting stock should be treated as the direct owner of such 
stock where the owner lacks either the legal title to or the voting 
rights inherent in such stock.56 It is generally accepted that the 
term "owns directly" should not be taken literally and that a 
taxpayer will be treated as the direct owner of stock if it retains 
beneficial ownership of such stock, regardless of whether the 
taxpayer retains legal title. However, it is not entirely clear what 
constitutes beneficial ownership for purposes of section 1504(a). 
According to one commentator, beneficial ownership of stock 
transferred into a voting trust or other escrow arrangement is 
retained by the grantor where the grantor retains both discretion 
regarding voting rights in order to preserve its equitable interest in 
the stock and the right to terminate the trust and demand back the 
stock at any time. 
G.C.M. 38,422 (June 25, 1980). General Counsel Memorandum 38,422 states that, 
because of the different purposes behind sections 368(c) and 1504(a), the terms "voting stock" 
and "voting power" as used in such sections are distinguishable (i.e., such terms have 
different meanings). Moreover, General Counsel Memorandum 38,422 states that General 
Counsel Memorandum 34,979, supranote 30, had "the effect of modifying General Counsel 
Memorandum 31,020 to remove the implication that these terms are synonymous for tax 
purposes." The author agrees that these terms are not synonymous. Voting stock refers to 
the inherent rights ofa class of stock in the issuing corporation, while voting power measures 
the ability of a shareholder to control a corporation because of such shareholder's stock 
ownership. The author does believe, however, that the terms "Voting stock" and "voting 
power" have the same meaning regardless of whether such terms are used in section 368(c) 
or section 1504(a). Where the two sections differ is that section 368(c) requires ownership of 
stock, while section 1504(a) requires direct or, as discussed below, beneficial ownership of the 
same stock. 
" One commentator frames the issue as follows: 
The 80 percent voting power and value test must be applied to the stock beneficially 
owned by the person, not to the incidents of stock ownership themselves-such as voting 
rights-that comprise beneficial ownership. Thus, by itself, the right to vote 80 percent 
of a corporation's stock would not satisfy the voting power prong ofthe 80 percent test, 
assuming that, standing alone, the right to vote stock does not confer beneficial 
ownership of the stock on the holder of the right. Furthermore, a person would satisfy 
the voting power prong if the person beneficially owned stock possessing at least 80 
percent of the voting power, even though he lacked the right to vote the stock. The 
concern here is whether a person can be the beneficialowner ofvoting stock if he lacks the 
right to vote the stock. 
Dick Yates, The Effect of the Lack of Stock Voting Rights on Beneficial Ownership Under 
Section 1504(a), 18 J. Corp. Tax'n 3, 4-5 (1991) (emphasis added). 
" Lerner, supra note 36, §2.03[3] at 2-43, citing Rev. Rul. 70-469, 1970-2 C.B. 179. 
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In Revenue Ruling 70-469,"s the Service held that a parent 
corporation (P) was the direct owner of 80 percent of the stock of a 
subsidiary (S) even though one share of S, which represented a 
portion of the 80 percent, was held in the name of a nominee (A). 
Although A was entitled to vote the stock during the time he held 
legal title to it, A was legally obligated to hold and deal with the 
share in accordance with P's directions. Furthermore, P was 
entitled to revoke the trust and regain legal title to the stock upon 
demand. In holding that P and S were affiliated, the Service stated 
that: 
The only thing lacking in P's complete and absolute ownership of 
the share that is held by A is the legal title and this P may at any 
time obtain by a demand upon A. P, being possessed of the entire 
beneficial ownership of the share and thus owning it, owns it 
"directly" because of its direct power over the share possessed by 
A, a power exercisable and legally enforceable at all times, and 
as complete as the dominion exercisable by one having both 
beneficial and legal ownership.59 
In Revenue Ruling 84-79,6o the Service concluded that P was the 
direct owner ofS stock even though such stock was contributed by 
68 1970-2 C.B. 179. 
11 Rev. Rul. 70-469, 1970-2 C.B. at 180. Revenue Ruling 70-469 supersedes General 
Counsel Memorandum 7331, VIII-2 C.B. 135 (1929). See 1970-2 C.B. VI at 180. In General 
Counsel Memorandum 7331, the Service held that where a parent corporation places the 
record ownership of stock in the hands of a nominee who is, at all times, legally obligated to 
hold and deal with the stock according to the orders of the parent corporation, the ownership 
of the stock by the parent corporation is direct within the meaning of section 141(d) of the 
Revenue Act of 1928. The Service's decision rested on the fact that "while the nominee is a 
technical trustee of the legal title, his relationship to the parent corporation is essentially 
that of an agent to his principal." G.C.M. 7331, VIII-2 C.B. at 135. Further, the Service 
noted that, while ownership through a nominee seemed to run contrary to the literal words 
of the statute, the direct ownership requirement was satisfied: 
The literal meaning of the term "directly" would seem to contemplate the ownership 
existing in the case under consideration. The parent corporation, being possessed of the 
entire beneficial ownership ofthe share and thus owning it, owns it "directly," because 
ofdirect power over the share possessed by the parent corporation-a power exercisable 
and legally enforceable by one having both beneficial and legal ownership. The 
ownership of the parent corporation, being sufficiently complete for all other purposes 
ofthe Revenue Act of 1928, is, therefore, "direct" within the meaning of section 141(d) 
ofthe Revenue Act of 1928. 
G.C.M. 7331, VIII-2 C.B. at 135. 
0 1984-1 C.B. 190. 
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P to a voting trust. Although the trustee had the power to vote the 
S stock, such power was limited since the trustee could not vote the 
stock either in favor of a sale of substantially all ofS's assets or in 
favor ofS's dissolution without P's consent. Furthermore, P could 
amend or terminate the trust or appoint a new trustee at any 
time.61 The Service, relying on Revenue Ruling 70-469, held that 
"P'sdominion over the S stock is 'as complete as the dominion 
exercisable by one having both beneficial and legal ownership,"' 
since P could request legal title to the S stock at any time by 
revoking the trust and could, through its ability to replace the 
trustee, control the trustee's vote with respect to the S stock.62 
In Revenue Ruling 78-119,63 the Service held that S was required 
to be included in P's consolidated federal income tax return where 
S's stock was placed in escrow and P lacked the ability to vote such 
stock. The Service concluded that "the escrowed stock was still 
voting stock even though the voting privilege had been temporarily 
suspended."' General Counsel Memorandum 37,333 affirmed the 
Service's conclusion in Revenue Ruling 78-119.6" Neither authority, 
however, referred to the "complete dominion" standard of Revenue 
Ruling 70-469. 
Similarly, the Service did not require complete dominion in order 
to find direct ownership in revenue rulings issued prior to Revenue 
Ruling 70-469. For example, in Revenue Ruling 63-104,66 the 
Service held that an affiliated group of corporations was required 
to include in its consolidated return a member that was under the 
control of a bankruptcy trustee. The voting rights of the stock of 
". The trust agreement further provided that P would receive all dividends (except for stock 
dividends) paid by S. 
6 1984-1 C.B. at 190-91. 
63 1978-1 C.B. 277. 
Id. at 279, citing DoernbecherMfg. Co. v. Commissioner,80 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1935). In 
Revenue Ruling 78-119, corporation M acquired all ofthe voting stock ofX from individual 
A in exchange for 100,000 shares ofM voting stock in a transaction qualifying under section 
368(a)(1)(B). Shortly thereafter, the value of the M stock (the consideration received byA) 
declined sharply. A filed a lawsuit against M seeking to rescind the transaction. The X stock 
was placed into the custody of the court and M was stripped of its ability to vote such stock 
pending the outcome of the litigation. Pursuant to a court-approved settlement, the X stock 
was returned to A in exchange for the M stock held by A in a transaction qualifying under 
section 355, while M was entitled to retain the dividends paid by X during the litigation. 
Nov. 28, 1977. 
1963-1 C.B. 172. 
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the member were rendered meaningless by the imposition of the 
bankruptcy trustee. 
In Revenue Ruling 55-458,67 the Service held that a corporation 
could be included in an affiliated group where its stock was 
purchased by the parent of such group but was held in escrow as 
security for the purchase price of the stock. Although legal title for 
the stock was held by an escrow agent, the parent of the affiliated 
group was the beneficial owner of such stock since it had "all rights 
of ownership including voting of the stock and the receipt of the 
amount of dividends paid on the stock, unless and until an event of 
default shall have occurred and be continuing."" 
In Revenue Ruling 68-623,69 the Service ruled that the parent of 
an affiliated group (N) could not file a consolidated return with an 
unrelated corporation (0) whose stock was leased by N from a 
second unrelated corporation (X). N entered into a lease agreement 
with X, which provided for the leasing to N of certain properties 
owned by X (including the stock of 0) for 99 years. X delivered to 
N all right, title and interest in the stock of 0, including the right 
to vote the shares and the right to receive dividends. N had the 
right to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the 0 stock only if such 
stock was not, in N's opinion, necessary and useful. X was required 
to execute the necessary documents and was entitled to any 
proceeds received upon the disposition of the stock of 0. The 
Service held that since, under the terms of the lease, N was not the 
owner of the 0 stock within the meaning of section 1504(a), N and 
O were unable to file consolidated returns as members of the same 
affiliated group.7° 
67 1955-2 C.B. 579. 
68 Id. 
69 1968-2 C.B. 404. 
70 The Service did not address whether Xs ownership of the 0 stock satisfied the 
ownership requirement of section 1504(a), thus allowing X and 0 to file a consolidated return. 
Connecticut& PassumpsicRivers R.R. Co. v. Commissioner,24 B.T.A. 394 (1931), on similar 
facts, held that the taxpayer and a subsidiary met the statutory requirements for affiliation, 
even though the taxpayer leased all of the rights inherent in ownership of the subsidiary's 
stock (including voting rights) to a third party for 99 years: 
Notwithstanding that under the terms of the lease certain rights constituting virtual 
control in the shares of the stock of Newport & Richford Railroad Company were 
released to the lessee for the period of the lease, the ownership of the stock remained 
with the petitioner .... On the basis ofcontinued ownership by the petitioner of all of 
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The Service's position as to what constitutes beneficial ownership 
is less clear in private letter rulings. The most recent private letter 
rulings, however, leave the impression that a shareholder may 
continue to be the beneficial owner of stock even though it has 
restricted its ability to vote the stock by transferring the stock into 
a voting trust. 
In one of the earliest rulings on this issue, the Service held that 
a parent and its subsidiary were affiliated, even though state 
insurance regulations required the subsidiary's stock to be held in 
trust. Although the parent was entitled to all dividends paid on the 
stock during the term of the trust, such stock was voted by the 
trustee, subject to instructions from the parent's shareholders. 
Also, the parent's shareholders, and not the parent, had the power 
to terminate the trust at any time, causing the stock to be returned 
to the parent. The Service held that, even though it did not retain 
all rights associated with the escrowed stock, the parent 
corporation retained beneficial ownership of such stock.71 
In Private Letter Ruling 77-49-047,72 the Service, relying on 
Revenue Ruling 70-469, held that a subsidiary was not includible 
in its parent's affiliated group because the parent did not own the 
subsidiary's stock directly, but rather owned it through a voting 
trust run by independent trustees pursuant to a railway 
reorganization plan. Since the parent had neither the ability to 
vote its subsidiary's stock nor the ability to reacquire legal title, it 
did not directly own such stock for purposes of section 1504(a). 
Conspicuously absent from the Service's analysis was any 
discussion of Revenue Ruling 63-104."3 In Private Letter Ruling 92-
the stock of the Newport & Richford Railroad Company there was a literal compliance 
with the statutory requirement for affiliation. 
Id. at 398. But see UnitedStates v. GeorgiaR.R. & Banking Co., 348 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(holding, on similar facts, that the lessor was not the beneficial owner of the stock for 
purposes of the dividends received deduction under section 243 and stating, in dicta, that if 
beneficial ownership of the leased stock resides anywhere during the lease term, it resides 
with the lessee). 
Revenue Ruling 68-623 neither relied on nor referred to the courts' decisions in 
Connecticut& PassumpsicRivers R.R. Co. and GeorgiaR.R. & Banking Co. Furthermore, it 
is unlikely that the Service would agree to follow either decision. 
71 P.L.R. 57-02-285770A (Feb. 28, 1957). 
Sept. 12, 1977.712 
71 See supratext accompanying note 66. 
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46-031, 74 however, the Service held that an insurance company 
remained a member of a consolidated group even though control of 
such company was shifted from its parent to a state insurance 
commissioner during the time such company was in rehabilitation. 
Similarly, in Private Letter Ruling 85-44-018,"5 the Service held 
that a parent and its subsidiary remained affiliated during the time 
such subsidiary was under control of the state's insurance 
department liquidation bureau. The bureau was directed to 
liquidate the subsidiary's business, which required that all property 
be placed in the bureau's name, the subsidiary's corporate charter 
be dissolved and all of the subsidiary's employees become 
employees of the bureau. In both Private Letter Ruling 92-46-031 
and Private Letter Ruling 85-44-018, the Service cited Revenue 
Ruling 63-104 in support ofits conclusion, thus effectively reversing 
its position in Private Letter Ruling 77-49-047.76 
In Private Letter Ruling 78-04-008, 77 X pledged all its shares in 
M, its wholly-owned subsidiary, to Y, an unrelated corporation, so 
that M could obtain financing. X also granted Z, the parent 
corporation of Y, an option to buy 50 percent of A's stock. Z was 
given the right to assert direct voting control over the M stock, a 
right which Z never exercised. Although X continued to vote the M 
stock at all times, since such right could be displaced 'by Z, the 
Service determined that "X does not meet the stock ownership 
requirements of section 1504(a) ofthe Code with regard to its stock 
ownership in M and therefore, does not constitute an affiliated 
group eligible to file a consolidated return." 
Aug. 18, 1992. 
July 20, 1985. 
76 See P.L.R. 91-02-104 (Oct. 11, 1990) (subsidiary placed into receivership by state 
banking commission was required to continue to file a consolidated return with its parent); 
P.L.R. 90-48-004 (Aug. 22, 1990) (subsidiary placed into receivership required to file 
consolidated return with its parent); P.L.R. 90-14-051 (Jan. 8, 1990) (subsidiary placed into 
FSLIC receivership must continue to consolidate with its parent); P.L.R. 89-14-023 (Dec. 29, 
1988) (same); P.L.R. 88-02-031 (Oct. 15, 1987) (bankruptcy filing by a subsidiary does not 
affect affiliation with parent corporation); P.L.R. 87-13-005 (Dec. 10, 1986) (same); P.L.R. 84-
44-063 (July 31, 1984) (assumption of control of a subsidiary by a trustee in bankruptcy does 
not affect section 1504 affiliation between a subsidiary and its parent). 
" Oct. 14, 1977. 
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In contrast, in Private Letter Ruling 78-35-007,78 the Service held 
that a corporation continued to remain affiliated with its subsidiary 
even though the stock of the subsidiary had been pledged to a 
creditor and the parent corporation was in default. The taxpayer-
debtor had full voting rights in the stock subject to the pledge 
agreement until it defaulted on its obligation. Upon an event of 
default, the creditor was required to give the taxpayer thirty days 
notice before it could sell the stock, during which time the taxpayer 
could cure its default. The Service held that the taxpayer and its 
subsidiary remained affiliated during an eleven day period in which 
the taxpayer was in default.79 
In Private Letter Ruling 79-39-042,'o the Service ruled that a 
taxpayer that transferred a subsidiary's stock to an irrevocable 
voting trust in order to comply with United States Department of 
Defense security clearance requirements was not affiliated with its 
subsidiary. The Service held that the grantor did not satisfy the 
requirements of section 1504(a) because it retained neither voting 
discretion over the stock nor the right to terminate the trust at any 
time and regain legal title. Similarly, in Private Letter Ruling 80-
40-054,sl the Service ruled that a corporation (B), which purchased 
the stock of a second corporation (C), was not considered the 
beneficial owner of the C stock during the time such stock was held 
in trust. B, which had previously owned 50 percent of C's stock, 
purchased the remaining 50 percent from an unrelated party. 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, a shareholder that purchases 
a controlling interest in a regulated company must secure the 
approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") prior to 
the acquisition. Therefore, immediately following the execution of 
the purchase agreement, the selling shareholder delivered the C 
stock to an unrelated trustee, which was required to vote the C 
May 23, 1978. 
,' See also P.L.R. 59-03-136060A (Mar. 13, 1959), in which the taxpayer was treated as the 
owner of the stock ofa subsidiary even though legal title to the shares was held by a bank as 
security for a loan. Up until the time the taxpayer was in default on the loan, the taxpayer 
possessed all of the rights of ownership in the stock including the right to vote such stock and 
the right to receive dividends. 
80 June 26, 1979. Private Letter Ruling 79-39-042 revoked an earlier ruling letter issued 
to the taxpayer's predecessor dated May 17, 1965 holding that the grantor of an identical 
trust retained beneficial ownership ofstock transferred to the trust. 
" July 10, 1980. 
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stock without regard to the best interests of B. 2 Relying on 
Revenue Ruling 70-469, the Service held that B was not the owner 
ofthe C stock as required by section 1504(a) since B had neither the 
right to vote the C stock nor the right to terminate the voting trust 
(except upon a sale of the C stock to a party that would not require 
ICC-approval prior to exercising control over such stock). 
In contrast, more recent rulings find that the affiliation 
requirements to be satisfied even where a parerit corporation's 
voting rights with respect to the stock of a subsidiary have been 
temporarily suspended through a voting trust or another similar 
arrangement. In Private Letter Ruling 86-10-018"3 and Private 
Letter Ruling 87-40-010,14 the Service held that the grantors of 
trusts similar to the trust established in Private Letter Ruling 80-
40-054 retained beneficial ownership ofthe stock deposited in such 
trusts.8 5 The Service, in these rulings, found the following facts 
relevant: (i) the grantor could (with ICC approval) instruct the 
trustee on how to vote the stock; (ii) the grantor received all 
dividends; (iii) the grantor had the right to, at any time, sell or 
dispose of the stock and receive the proceeds; (iv) the grantor had 
the right, at the time the trust was to be terminated, to receive 
8 The purpose of establishing a voting trust was to ensure that B could not exercise any 
control over C's business pending approval from the ICC. The trustee was required not to 
exercise its voting power in C (i) in a manner that would cause any dependence or 
intercorporate relationship between B and C and (ii) to elect as officers or directors of C any 
persons known to it to be officers or directors of B without the approval of the ICC. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure independent administration of the trust, the parties agreed 
that for the life ofthe trust (i) neither the trustee, nor any affiliate of the trustee, would have 
any officer or director that was also known to be an officer or director ofB or any affiliate of 
B, (ii) neither the trustee, nor any affiliate of the trustee, would have any direct or indirect 
business arrangements or dealings, financial or otherwise, with B or any affiliate ofB, other 
than dealings pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of the trust, and (iii) neither 
B, nor any affiliate of B, would communicate or try to communicate with the trustee, whether 
directly or indirectly, except to advise the trustee of the occurrence of an event that would 
terminate the trust. 
83 Nov. 29, 1985. 
July 1, 1987. 
' While neither Private Letter Ruling 86-10-018 nor Private Letter Ruling 87-40-010 
mention that such trusts were established to comply with ICC regulations, Private Letter 
Ruling 86-10-018 cites a case that upheld the legality of ICC voting trusts. See Illinois 
Central R.R. Co. v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 421 (N.D. Ill. 1966), affd, 385 U.S. 457 (1967). 
Presumably, Private Letter Ruling 87-40-010 also involved a voting trust established to 
comply with ICC regulations because of its factual similarities with Private Letter Ruling 86-
10-018. See Yates supranote 56, at 11. 
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either legal title to the stock or the proceeds from the sale of the 
stock; (v) there was a valid business purpose for the trust and (vi) 
the trust was intended to last for only a short period of time. 6 
In Private Letter Ruling 89-19-014," 7 a foreign corporation 
entered into proxy agreements with respect to the voting rights of 
certain of its subsidiaries in order to satisfy federal regulations that 
limited the ability of foreign owned contractors to receive security 
clearance. Without clearance, the subsidiaries could not continue 
to perform research and development work for the government. 
Under the proxy arrangements, proxy holders were required to 
exercise independent judgment in voting the shares of the 
subsidiaries; however, the proxy holders were expected to "act in 
good faith as reasonably prudent persons to protect the economic 
interests" of the parent in its subsidiaries. Proxy holders could only 
be removed for gross negligence or willful misconduct and 
successors were to be appointed by a majority of the remaining 
proxy holders, not the parent corporation. Notwithstanding the 
broad authority granted to the proxy holders, such holders could 
not, without the consent of the parent corporation, undertake 
certain extraordinary corporate actions. In contrast to Private 
Letter Ruling 79-39-042, the Service held that the parent 
corporation maintained beneficial and direct ownership within the 
meaning of section 1504(a). 
Finally, in Private Letter Ruling 91-40-013,"8 the Service held 
that a parent's transfer of its subsidiary stock to a trust left the 
parent and its consolidated group with "sufficient ownership in the 
transferred [subsidiary) stock to avoid disaffiliation of the 
[subsidiary]" from the group. Pursuant to a tender offer made by 
a member of the parent's consolidated group, the parent would have 
owned two companies operating similar businesses. In order to 
alleviate antitrust concerns, the parent agreed to appoint an 
independent trustee to sell either the existing subsidiary or the 
's Although these private letter rulings cite Revenue Ruling 70-469 and Revenue Ruling 
84-79 for support, the Service has clearly moved away from the "complete dominion" standard 
of the revenue rulings. Although in both private letter rulings the taxpayers could dispose 
of the stock and were entitled to the disposition proceeds, the taxpayers did not have complete 
voting control over the stock or the ability to remove the trustee. 
8' Feb. 9, 1989. 
8 June 28, 1991. 
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competing business."9 The parent executed a trust agreement that 
transferred its subsidiary stock into a trust under which all voting 
rights were to be held by an independent trustee.90 The Service 
stated: 
We note that the Trust Agreement was to be of relatively short 
duration. Moreover, notwithstanding that the voting rights 
associated with the Sub stock have been placed under the sole 
control of the trustee, Parent retains all economic interest in the 
Sub stock through dividends and appreciation potential. 
Additionally, if Parent group should decide to sell Target Sub, 
Parent could terminate the trust and reacquire the voting rights 
in Sub .... Considering the above factors, the Parent affiliated 
group retains sufficient ownership in the transferred Sub stock 
to avoid disaffiliation of Sub. 
The Service has rarely cited early case law concerning whether 
voting rights are necessary to have beneficial ownership of stock; 
such decisions generally extended the affiliation provisions of the 
Code to situations in which the Service's rulings would appear not 
' to apply. Current court decisions appear to be more aligned with 
the Service's public ruling policy. For example, in Miami National 
Bank v. Commissioner,92 the Tax Court held that where an 
individual ("Transferor") transferred more than 80 percent of the 
stock of a corporation to his broker and such stock was held in a 
"subordinated securities account," he remained the beneficial owner 
of the stock. Thus, a sale of the stock to another corporation 
("Parent") resulted in Parent acquiring beneficial ownership of the 
The government's concerns presumably involved antitrust issues as the ruling stated 
that the transaction proposed in the ruling may have violated provisions ofthe Clayton Act. 
'o The trustee could, however, seek advice from the parent if it deemed the advice helpful 
in running the subsidiary's business. 
11 Moreover, it is unlikely that the earliest court decisions have any validity under current 
section 1504(a), except with respect to their most basic principles. At the time such cases 
were decided, the statute required that two or more corporations be "owned or controlled by 
the same interests" in order to satisfy the affiliation requirements. This language had been 
interpreted to require unity of either ownership or control of multiple corporations, but did 
not require unity of both ownership and control. See Lavenstein Corp. v. Commissioner,25 
F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1928). Congress later adopted an affiliation test based solely upon 
stock ownership. As discussed herein, this test is satisfied by beneficial ownership. 
67 T.C. 793 (1977). 92 
1997] Definitionof Voting Stock 
stock. After the sale, Parent directly owned a sufficient amount of 
the corporation's stock to file a consolidated return. The court held 
that even though the broker had legal title to the stock, such stock 
was subject to the claims of the broker's creditors and the broker 
could under certain circumstances sell the stock, the Transferor 
was the beneficial owner of the stock because it had all other rights 
associated with the stock, including voting rights and the right to 
receive dividends.93 Moreover, the Transferor also had the right to 
withdraw the stock from the subordinated securities account at any 
time by substituting cash or other marketable securities of equal 
value. Furthermore, if the stock were sold, the Transferor had a 
claim against his broker based upon the value of the stock at the 
time of sale.94 Therefore, the Transferor retained the benefit of any 
appreciation and the burden of any depreciation in the value of the 
stock." While the court in Miami NationalBank cites a number of 
the earliest cases in this area for support,96 the court focuses on the 
right of the Transferor to vote the stock, receive dividends and 
reacquire legal title at any time-the factors relied upon by the 
Service in Revenue Ruling 70-469 97-in holding that beneficial 
ownership was retained despite the absence of legal title. 
3. INI, Inc. v. Commissioner 
In the most recent decision addressing the issue of beneficial 
ownership under section 1504(a), the Tax Court held that a 
corporation ("Parent") that granted one of its shareholders an 
irrevocable proxy to vote the stock of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
("Sub"), along with an agreement to distribute eventually the Sub 
stock to such shareholder, severed the affiliation between Parent 
and Sub.9 Because of a disagreement between Parent's two 
shareholders, Jones and Cates, over the operation and management 
of the business, the.shareholders agreed to divide the business by 
" Id. at 801, 804. 
Id. at 800-01. 
"5 Id. at 801. 
' Id. at 799 (citing, interal., Lavenstein). 
17 See supratext accompanying note 58. 
" INI, Inc. v. Commissioner,69 T.C.M. 2113 (1995). 
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distributing all of Sub's stock to Jones in exchange for his Parent 
stock. Cates would then own all the stock of Parent. The 
distribution was delayed, however, because of a preexisting 
agreement that limited the transfer of Parent stock for a period of 
time.' Desiring to divide the business as quickly as possible, Jones 
granted Cates a proxy to vote his Parent stock. Cates, in turn, had 
Parent grant Jones a proxy to vote the Sub stock. The distribution 
was completed at a later date.'00 
The Service argued that Parent's grant of the irrevocable proxy 
to vote the Sub stock to Jones ended the affiliation between Parent 
and Sub. The taxpayer argued that Sub did not leave the Parent's 
consolidated group until the Sub stock was distributed to Jones. 
The Tax Court agreed with the Service, holding that the execution 
of the irrevocable proxy to vote the Sub stock was sufficient to 
break consolidation between Parent and Sub.10' 
The court relied on Miami NationalBank, concluding that "the 
ownership referred to in section 1504(a) is beneficial ownership 
regardless of the arrangement by which it is created." °2 Thus, the 
court determined that the relevant inquiry involved when a 
transfer of beneficial ownership occurred. Relying on state law
10 3 
and the intent ofthe parties, the court concluded that the execution 
of an irrevocable proxy was sufficient to cause Parent and Sub to 
deconsolidate.104 
" The delay resulted from a standfast agreement with a third-party partnership in which 
Parent was a partner. Since the transfer of 50 percent or more of the stock of a corporate 
partner was considered to be a transfer of a partnership interest under section 708, the 
standfast agreement was entered into to prevent a transfer by Jones or Cates of their Parent 
stock from causing a termination of the partnership. INI, 69 T.C.M. at 2116. 
100 Id. 
.0.Id. at 2121. 
192 Id. (citing MiamiNat'l Bank, 67 T.C. at 801). 
103 The court cited Estate of Craft v. Commissioner,68 T.C. 249, 263 (1977), affd, 608 F.2d 
240 (5th Cir. 1979) (A "fundamental principle of tax law [is] that State law creates legal 
rights and property interests while the Federal law determines what, and to what extent, 
interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."). INI, 69 T.C. at 2121. 
104 INI, 69 T.C. at 2121. Under Georgia law, the beneficial ownership of a share of stock is 
transferred when an irrevocable proxy to vote such stock is transferred. The law provides 
that a proxy is revocable unless it is coupled with an interest and, by its terms, expressly 
provides that it is irrevocable. A proxy coupled with an interest is defined to include a proxy 
executed in favor of a person who has purchased or has agreed to purchase the underlying 
shares. Id. (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-722(d)(2) (1994)). 
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While at first glance INI appears to expand the definition of 
beneficial ownership, the decision is nothing more than an 
extension of the Service's prior rulings. The court in INI merely 
affirmed prior precedent that held that when a corporation 
relinquishes beneficial ownership of a subsidiary's stock, it no 
longer directly owns such stock and can no longer be considered a 
member of an affiliated group within the meaning of section 
1504(a). In other words, legal title does not a direct owner make. 
E. Conclusion 
Although the definition of voting stock-stock having the current 
ability to vote for directors who control the management of the 
corporation-is the same under both section 368(c) and section 
1504(a) of the Code, the policies underlying these two statutory 
provisions are very different. Hence their different application in 
case law and rulings. A taxpayer attempting to satisfy the control 
requirement of section 368(c) need only own stock possessing 80 
percent of the voting power of the corporation-such taxpayer need 
not have the right or ability to vote such stock. It is the inherent 
characteristic of a class of stock to vote for directors that makes 
such stock voting stock. Shareholder voting agreements, proxies 
and voting trusts have no effect on the characterization of stock as 
5voting stock for purposes of section 368(c).' ° 
Because section 1504(a) requires a parent corporation to have 
voting control over its subsidiaries, the effect of arrangements that 
limit voting control requires a different analysis. While it appears 
that the courts and the Service have moved away from the rigid 
two-part test established in Revenue Ruling 70-469, inconsistent 
holdings by the Service in revenue rulings and private letter 
rulings have left practitioners puzzled as to whether a taxpayer 
who owns voting stock and enters into a shareholders agreement or 
other voting arrangement with respect to such stock will retain 
sufficient beneficial ownership in the stock to qualify for affiliation. 
...The stock may also be treated as voting stock if the owner of such stock is legally 
prohibited from voting its shares. See Rev. Rul. 73-28, 1973-1 C.B. 187. See also text 
accompanying notes 29-32 supra. 
06 
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It is incumbent on the Treasury to issue regulations to clarify 
when the owner of voting stock may relinquish certain incidents of 
ownership and still be considered the direct owner of such stock.1 
The regulations should provide that the owner of voting stock will 
remain the beneficial owner of stock that is subject to a 
shareholders agreement or that is placed in a voting trust if (i) 
there is a valid business purpose for the agreement or trust, (ii) the 
agreement or trust is intended to operate for only a short period of 
time, (iii) under certain conditions, the owner of the stock could 
terminate the trust and regain legal title to the stock, (iv) the owner 
of the stock is entitled to receive all dividends (except for stock 
dividends) paid on the stock, (v) the owner of the stock is entitled, 
at any time, to sell or dispose of the stock and receive all cash 
proceeds and (vi) the owner of the stock would be entitled to regain 
legal title to the stock upon termination of the trust. 
Absent such guidance by .the Treasury, the Service should issue 
either a revenue procedure, providing guidelines which a taxpayer 
requesting a private letter ruling under section 1504 must satisfy, 
or further revenue rulings, providing safe harbor situations in 
which the owner of stock retains beneficial ownership of such stock 
after entering into a shareholders agreement or placing stock into 
a voting trust. Without such guidance, taxpayers attempting to 
satisfy the direct ownership requirement of section 1504(a) should 
either attempt to place themselves within the parameters provided 
by Revenue Ruling 70-469 or seek a private letter ruling from the 
Service. 
IV. MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER 
A. Ability to Elect Directors 
Once it is determined that stock qualifies as voting stock and 
that a taxpayer is the owner of (or, for purposes of section 1504(a), 
directly owns) such stock, the next step is to determine whether the 
taxpayer owns stock possessing "at least 80 percent of the total 
.0 Section 1504(a)(5) grants the Treasury broad authority to prescribe regulations 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the consolidated return provisions of the 
Code. 
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07 combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote"1 or 
owns directly "at least 80 percent of the total voting power of the 
stock of such corporation."'0 8 
Since, as previously discussed, voting stock is defined as stock 
that participates in the management of the corporation through the 
election of directors, 0 9 the most common method of measuring the 
voting power inherent in stock held by a taxpayer is to calculate the 
percentage of the directors of a corporation the taxpayer can elect. 
Where only one class ofvoting stock exists, this calculation is made 
by dividing the number of shares of stock held by the taxpayer by 
0the total number of shares of voting stock outstanding.11 
Where a corporation's equity consists of two or more classes of 
voting stock and the shares of each class have the same ability to 
vote for all directors, a taxpayer's voting power is similarly 
computed by dividing the number of shares of voting stock held by 
the taxpayer by the total number of shares of voting stock 
107 I.R.C. § 368(c). 
I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2)(A). 
See Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218. 
110 In General Counsel Memorandum 34,795 (Mar. 1, 1972), the Service held that the 
ownership of 58 percent of the outstanding voting stock of a corporation did not constitute 
control within the meaning of sections 368(c) and 355 even though such stock represents de 
facto control since the owner ofsuch stock could elect 100 percent of the corporation's board 
ofdirectors. Since only one class of voting stock was outstanding, control was determined by 
computing the percentage of the total number of shares owned by the taxpayer. See also 
Handy & Hardmanv. Burnet,284 U.S. 136 (1931) (reaching a similar conclusion under the 
consolidated return provisions ofthe Code). 
In Private Letter Ruling 97-14-002 (Dec. 26, 1996), the Service held that a taxpayer 
could not file a consolidated return with its subsidiary during the period it held only 74 
percent of the votes inherent in the subsidiary's voting stock even though, because the 
subsidiary did not have cumulative voting for directors, the taxpayer could elect all of the 
members of the subsidiary's board. The Service found itself bound by the literal language of 
section 1504(a)(2)(A) which requires that a taxpayer own stock possessing 80 percent of the 
total voting power of a subsidiary corporation and not solely, as the taxpayer claimed, own 
sufficient stock to elect 80 percent of the subsidiary's board. The Service stated that the stock 
owned by the taxpayer would, if it were widely held, possess only 74 percent of its issuer's 
voting power: 
It is only the fact that [the taxpayer] owns 100 percent of the [subsidiary's] common 
stock and that [the subsidiary] employs cumulative voting that allows [the taxpayer] to 
elect at least 80 percent of [the subsidiary's] directors. This does not satisfy the 
requirements of the statute that [the taxpayer] (or members of its affiliated group) own 
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total voting power of the stock of [the 
subsidiary]. Regardless of the actual effect of [the taxpayer's] ownership of the common 
stock, [the taxpayer] only owns stock possessing 74 percent ofthe voting power of [the 
subsidiary]. 
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outstanding. For example, in Pantlind Hotel Company v. 
Commissioner,11' the court held that a taxpayer was not entitled to 
file an affiliated return with its subsidiary where it owned 3,971 
shares of the subsidiary's 3,989 shares of common stock and 1,016 
of its 4,453 shares of preferred stock. During the period in 
question, both the common and preferred stock were entitled to vote 
for the subsidiary's directors. Thus, even though the taxpayer 
owned 99.55 percent of the voting common stock, it owned only 
55.56 percent of all the voting stock of its subsidiary. 
The calculation of voting power becomes more complex where a 
corporation has two or more classes of voting stock that either vote 
independently for their own classes of directors or have a different 
number ofvotes per share. In the former situation, the Service has 
generally looked to the voting power that each class of stock holds 
and then to the voting power that a shareholder holds in each 
class. 1 1 2 For example, in Income Tax Ruling 3896,11' the Service 
held that where a taxpayer owned 100 percent of the common stock 
of a corporation, which had the ability to elect six of the 
corporation's seven directors, and 55.5 percent of the preferred 
1 23 B.T.A. 1207 (1931). 
112 In one case, however, the United States Claims Court discussed a different method of 
computing voting control. In Hermes Consolidated,Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 398 
(1988), the court held that a taxpayer owned less than 50 percent of the voting power of the 
stock of a corporation (Hermes) for purposes of section 269 of the Code. There, the taxpayer 
(Hamilton) owned all 100,000 shares ofHermes' voting common stock while the corporation's 
other shareholder (H.P.I.) owned all 104,000 shares of Hermes' voting preferred stock. 
Hermes' board of directors consisted of three directors: one elected by the common 
shareholder, one elected by the preferred shareholder and a third elected by the majority of 
all shares voting as a single class. Although the court noted that the general method of 
computing voting power is the determination of the percentage of voting stock owned by the 
taxpayer (and under that methodology, Hamilton owned only 49.02 percent of Hermes' voting 
power (100,000/204,000)), the court computed Hamilton's voting power to be 33/3 percent 
since Hamilton and H.P.I. each had the ability to elect one director to Hermes' board. 
Furthermore: 
[t]he third member of the board was elected from the majority of all the shares voting 
from a single class. Since H.P.I. had 104,000 shares and Hamilton only had 100,000 
shares, H.P.I. had the power to elect independently the third member of the board. In 
measuring Hamilton's power to elect Hermes' board of directors then, Hamilton held a 
33'/3% interest since it controlled only enough votes to elect one out of the three 
members. 
Id. at 405-06. 
The Service has rejected this "all-or-nothing" approach in determining the voting power 
inherent in a taxpayer's stock. See supra note 110. 
"' See supra note 15. 
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stock, which possessed the power to elect the remaining director, 
the taxpayer owned stock in its subsidiary possessing less than 95 
percent of the voting power of the subsidiary, and thus the taxpayer 
and its subsidiary were not affiliated within the meaning of the 
Code. In determining the percentage of the voting power held by 
the taxpayer in the subsidiary corporation, the Service found that 
the common stock constituted six-sevenths, or 85.714 percent, and 
the preferred stock constituted one-seventh, or 14.286 percent, of 
the voting power of the subsidiary corporation. Thus, the parent 
corporation owned "stock possessing 85.714 per cent plus 7.929 per, 
cent (55.5 per cent of 14.286 per cent), or 93.643 per cent of the 
voting power of all classes of stock." 114 
In Revenue Ruling 69-126,115 the Service held that a taxpayer 
met the 80 percent voting power requirement for affiliation under 
section 1504(a) where the taxpayer owned 100 percent of the 
common stock and 50 percent of the preferred stock of a subsidiary 
corporation. The holders of common stock had the power to elect 
five ofthe eight directors, and the holders of preferred stock had the 
power to elect the remaining three directors. Because the common 
stock had the ability to elect five-eighths of the directors, those 
shares contained 62.5 percent of the voting power of the 
corporation. The preferred stock constituted three-eighths, or 37.5 
percent, of the voting power of the corporation. Therefore, the 
taxpayer owned 62.5 percent plus 18.75 percent (50 percent of 3.7.5 
percent), or 81.25 percent of all classes of voting stock of the 
corporation. 
In Revenue Ruling 63-234,116 the Service determined that a 
corporation owning 78 percent of the common stock of a subsidiary 
corporation, which stock entitled the holder to elect ten of twelve 
members of the subsidiary's board, and 100 percent ofthe preferred 
stock of the subsidiary, which entitled the holder to elect the 
remaining two board members, owned 81.67 percent of the voting 
power of all classes of stock of the subsidiary corporation.117 
114 1948-1 C.B. at 76. 
...1969-1 C.B. 218. 
...1963-2 C.B. 148. 
117 The common stock represented 83.33 percent of the voting power of the subsidiary 
(10/12), and the preferred stock represented 16.67 percent (2/12). Thus, the corporation 
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Where a corporation has multiple classes of stock with the power 
to elect the directors of the corporation and each class of stock has 
a different number of votes per share, a taxpayer's voting power in 
the corporation is calculated by dividing the number of votes held 
by the taxpayer by the total number of votes inherent in all of the 
voting stock of the corporation. Thus, for example, in Anderson-
Clayton SecuritiesCorporationv. Commissioner,118 the court ruled 
in favor of a taxpayer who argued that because it owned 6,400 of 
the 10,000 shares of its subsidiary's common stock, which carried 
one vote per share or 6,400 votes, and all 4,800 shares of its 
subsidiary's preferred stock, which carried 50 votes per share or 
240,000 votes, it owned 98.56 percent of its subsidiary's stock 
(246,400/250,000).119 The Service had argued that the taxpayer 
owned only 75.67 percent of the subsidiary's stock (11,200 
shares/14,800 shares). In holding for the taxpayer, the court 
determined that in requiring affiliation to be based upon the 
ownership of a percentage of a corporation's voting stock, Congress 
intended to focus on the voting power inherent in the stock and not 
merely ownership of a number of shares. Thus, the taxpayer was 
correct in determining its percentage ownership in its subsidiaries 
by looking to the votes it could cast instead of the number of shares 
it owned.12 ° The Service has subsequently affirmed the court's 
holding by using the Anderson-Clayton methodology in computing 
voting power in private letter rulings.121 
owned 65 percent (78 percent of 83.33 percent) plus 16.67 percent, or 81.67 percent of the 
voting power of the subsidiary corporation. 
18 35 B.T.A. 795 (1937). 
Id. at 797. 
120 Id. 
121 In Private Letter Ruling 82-21-112 (Feb. 26, 1982), the Service held that a taxpayer and 
its subsidiary could file a consolidated return where the taxpayer owned all 22,498 shares of 
its subsidiary's common stock, each entitled to one vote per share; while another group of 
taxpayers owned the subsidiary's 6,867 shares of Class B common stock, each entitled to 0.8 
votes per share. The Service computed the voting power of the shares held by the taxpayer 
in the following manner: 
The instant case differs from Rev. Rul. 69-126 in that both the Common and Class B 
Common stock are entitled to vote in all matters, rather than one of the classes being 
restricted to voting for directors only. Accordingly, the voting power of the two classes 
does not initially have to be determined by reference to the number of directors which 
can be elected by each class. Rather the voting power is determined by reference to the 
votes allocated to each class. The 22,498 shares of Common stock owned entirely by 
Corp P have one vote per share. The 6,867 shares of Class B Common stock owned 
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B. Structuringthe Voting Powerof a 
Corporation'sShares 
1. Recapitalization 
The use of a mechanical test to determine voting power gives a 
corporation the ability to recapitalize its equity using voting stock 
with voting rights disproportional to its equity value in order to 
obtain the desired tax treatment in a subsequent transaction that 
is required to satisfy the control requirement of section 368(c).'22 
The following examples provide situations where a restructuring is 
both a useful and necessary preliminary step in receiving the 
desired tax treatment. 
Example 1. Corporation X, which owns 70 percent of the 
stock of Corporation Y, wants to distribute the Y stock to its 
shareholders in a tax-free transaction qualifying under 
section 355. A distribution by X of the stock of a 
corporation which it does not control could give rise to a tax 
entirely by D and C, and held in the voting trust, have 0.8 votes per share, and thus 
represent a total of 5,494 votes. The total number ofvotes held by all classes of voting 
stock is 27,992. Corp P's ownership ofthe Common stock entitles Corp P to 80.4 percent 
of this total number of votes. 
The Service also pointed to an amendment to the subsidiary's certificate of incorporation 
that provided the taxpayer with the ability to elect 15 out of the 18 members of subsidiary's 
board of directors and the right to vote proportionately to elect one of the three remaining 
members. The other two of the subsidiary's board members were to be elected by one ofthe 
shareholders of the Class B Common stock. The Service stated that this amendment to the 
certificate of incorporation served to increase the taxpayer's voting power in the subsidiary, 
making it clear that the taxpayer satisfied the voting power requirement of section 1504(a) 
of the Code. The taxpayer's ability to elect 15 of 18 board members, as well as the ability to 
participate in the election of one of the three remaining board members, gave the taxpayer 
87.8 percent of the voting power in its subsidiary (15/18 + [.804 * 1/18]). 
If the management of the subsidiary was vested in the subsidiary's board of directors, 
only the second method of computing voting power is relevant. It is possible, however, that 
the Service was attempting to use the facts of the ruling to distinguish the method of 
computing voting power where different classes ofshares contain different voting rights from 
the computation wheie different classes of shares each independently elect the members of 
a company's board of directors. See also P.L.R. 97-14-002 (Dec. 26, 1996) (computing voting 
power based upon the number ofvotes held by the taxpayer, not the number of shares); P.L.R. 
80-30-007 (Apr. 14, 1980) (computing voting power using the Anderson-Claytonmethodology 
where one class of stock had six votes per share and the other class had one vote per share). 
A recapitalization is not useful, however, in attempting to qualify a group of corporations 
as affiliated corporations because section 1504(a) defines affiliation using both a vote and 
value test. See supranote 11 and accompanying text. 
122 
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liability to both X and its shareholders. A recapitalization 
of Y, in which X receives all of a new class of stock that 
elects 80 percent of Ys directors and in which the 
remaining shareholders receive a class of stock that elects 
20 percent of Y's directors, would give X control of Y within 
the meaning of section 368(c). A subsequent distribution 
by X of the Y stock would qualify under section 355. 
Example 2. Corporation A has one class of stock owned 
entirely by Corporation B. A needs to raise capital and 
decides that the best way to do so is through a public 
offering. A wants to sell 40 percent of its equity; B, 
however, wants to retain the flexibility to later distribute 
the A stock to its shareholders in a tax-free manner. Here, 
a public offering by A of a new class of voting stock 
representing 40 percent of A's equity, but less than 20 
percent ofA's voting power, would satisfy the objectives of 
both A and B. 
Example 3. Corporation C is a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Corporation D. C wishes to acquire unrelated 
Corporation E using its common stock as consideration; 
however, E is larger than C and the issuance of C's stock to 
the E shareholders would result in D losing control of C. 
By having C issue the E shareholders a second class of low-
vote stock of C, D could retain voting control over C. 
The Service has approved a recapitalization of a corporation as 
a first step in a larger transaction only where the recapitalization 
brings about a permanent realignment of voting power. For 
example, in Revenue Ruling 56-117,123 Distributing owned all of 
the common stock and 12 percent ofthe non-voting preferred stock 
of Controlled. 124 Pursuant to a plan of reorganization, Controlled 
exchanged newly issued Controlled common stock for all of the 
123 1956-1 C.B. 180. 
124 For purposes ofthis section of the article, the terms "Distributing" and "Controlled" will 
refer to the distributing corporation and the controlled corpbration in a spin-off transaction 
intending to qualify under section 355. 
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Controlled preferred stock not held by Distributing. This allowed 
Distributing to distribute its entire interest in Controlled (93 
percent of Controlled's common stock and 100 percent of 
Controlled's preferred stock) in a non-pro rata spin-off that satisfied 
the control requirement of section 355.125 
Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 69-407,126 the Service held that the 
recapitalization of Controlled to provide Distributing with a greater 
number of shares of common stock with a lower par value gave 
Distributing control and constituted a reorganization within the 
meaning of section 368(a)(1)(E). 2 7  Since Distributing was in 
control of Controlled after the recapitalization, the distribution of 
the Controlled stock by Distributing qualified as a nontaxable 
distribution under section 355.12 
In Revenue Ruling 69-407, the Service distinguished Revenue 
Ruling 63-260,129 in which an individual, A, owned 30 shares of 
Controlled stock and all 100 shares of the stock of Distributing, 
which, in turn, owned the remaining 70 shares of Controlled stock. 
A transferred 10 shares of Controlled stock to Distributing in order 
to allow Distributing to distribute 80 shares of Controlled stock to 
him in a section 355 transaction. The Service held that the 
distribution did not qualify under section 355 because Distributing 
was not in control- of Controlled immediately prior to the 
distribution except in "a transitory and illusory sense."13 ° Since 
" It was necessary to recapitalize Controlled so that Distributing would own 80 percent 
of Controlled's voting stock and 80 percent of each class of Controlled's non-voting stock as 
required by section 355. See supra note 7 and the accompanying text. 
126 1969-2 C.B. 50. 
127 In Revenue Ruling 69-407, Distributing exchanged 700 shares of Controlled common 
stock with a par value of$100 per share for 800 shares of Controlled common stock with a par 
value of $87.50 per share. Controlled's minority shareholders exchanged 300 shares of 
common stock with a par value of$100 per share for 200 shares of common stock with a par 
value of $150 per share. Accordingly, Distributing increased its voting power in Controlled 
from 70 percent to 80 percent. 
12 In General Counsel Memorandum 34,122 (May 8, 1969), which supports the Service's 
position in Revenue Ruling 69-407, the Service states that: 
[it has been held that the use ofa recapitalization for the purpose of diluting the voting 
power ofone class of stock in order to increase the voting power of another class, thereby 
shifting voting control to a different group of shareholders, is a sufficient purpose to 
qualify the exchange as a reorganization under section 112(g)(1)(E) of the 1939 Code [the 
predecessor to section 368(a)(1)(E)]. 
1963-2 C.B. 147. 
130 Id. 
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both immediately prior to and immediately after the transaction A 
owned the 10 shares of Controlled stock, the transfer of such stock 
to Distributing had no significance. The Service stated that 
"[siection 355 of the Code cannot be made to apply to a transaction 
in which an immediately preceding contribution to capital by the 
distributor corporation's shareholder is made solely to attempt to 
qualify the transaction as a nontaxable distribution under that 
section."1 31  In Revenue Ruling 69-407, however, the 
recapitalization prior to the distribution was respected as it 
"resulted in a permanent realignment of voting control."132 
In Revenue Ruling 76-223,"' the Service respected a 
recapitalization of a corporation's non-voting preferred stock into 
voting preferred stock prior to an acquisitive reorganization since 
such recapitalization effected a permanent change in the voting 
rights of the corporation. There, Corporation X wished to acquire 
the stock of Corporation Y, which had 81 shares of common stock 
and 19 shares of non-voting preferred stock outstanding, in a 
transaction pursuant to section 368(a)(1)(B). X, however, did not 
wish to acquire the Y preferred stock. In order to qualify as a tax-
free reorganization, Ys charter was amended to give voting rights 
to the preferred stock. X's subsequent acquisition of the common
3 4 
stock satisfied the control requirement. 
1 
The Service has also ruled privately that a recapitalization 
should be respected where it constitutes the first step in a larger 
transaction. In Private Letter Ruling 95-47-049,"' Distributing 
owned less than 80 percent of the voting power of Controlled. 
Pursuant to a plan of recapitalization, Distributing exchanged 
shares of Controlled common stock, which had one vote per share, 
for a new class of Controlled preferred stock, which had five votes 
per share. As a result, Distributing acquired control of Controlled, 
...Id. at 148. 
132 1969-2 C.B. at 51. 
. 1976-1 C.B. 103. 
" Section 368(a)(1)(B) requires that, immediately after an acquisition, the acquiring 
corporation has control of the acquired corporation. Since following the recapitalization, the 
common stock represented more than 80 percent of the voting power inherent in Ys stock and 
since there was no non-voting stock, Xs acquisition of the common stock resulted in X 
acquiring control of Y within the meaning of section 368(c). 
" June 2, 1995. 
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allowing Distributing to distribute the Controlled stock to its 
shareholders tax-free under section 355.136 In Private Letter Ruling 
86-31-014,137 the Service ruled that a distribution qualified under 
section 355 where, prior to the distribution, Controlled's common 
stock had been recapitalized into two classes of common stock, one 
with 0.6 votes per share and the other with 1.4 votes per share, in 
order to allow Distributing to acquire control of Controlled. Finally, 
in Private Letter Ruling 94-09-043,138 the Service respected a 
recapitalization of Controlled's common stock into two classes of 
common stock, one with three votes per share and the other with 
one vote per share, as a preliminary step for a spin-off of 
Controlled. Distributing distributed Controlled's high-vote common 
stock to its shareholders tax-free under section 355. Controlled 
issued the low-vote stock to the public following the distribution, 
thereby allowing Controlled to raise additional capital without 
Distributing's shareholders losing control of Controlled. 
139 
136 The published version of Private Letter Ruling 95-47-049 does not state the number of 
votes inherent in Controlled's common and preferred stock. This information is based upon 
the author's personal knowledge of the transaction. 
137 Apr. 28, 1986. 
133 Dec. 9, 1993. 
133 Although Distributing was in control of Controlled prior to the spin-off, Distributing's 
shareholders were required to be "in control" of Controlled after the distribution because the 
preliminary step of the transaction was the contribution of assets to a newly formed 
corporation (which qualified as a tax-free reorganization pursuant to section 368(a)(1)(D)) 
prior to the distribution under section 355. While Distributing needed only to "distribute 
control" of Controlled under section 355, section 368(a)(1)(D) required the transferor (or its 
shareholders) to be "in control" of the transferee corporation immediately after the exchange. 
Failure of Distributing's shareholders to remain in control of Controlled after the distribution 
would have caused the spin-off to have been taxable. This disparate treatment between spin-
offs that are solely required to satisfy the "distribute control" requirement of section 355 and 
those that are required to satisfy the "in control" requirement of section 368(a)(1)(D) has been 
mitigated by section 1012(c) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 
See also P.L.R. 93-28-026 (Apr. 19, 1993) (conversion of preferred stock into common 
stock prior to spinoff); P.L.R. 91-29-056 (Apr. 25, 1991) (recapitalization prior to spinoff 
respected); P.L.R. 90-15-041 (Jan. 12, 1990) (recapitalization of Controlled's non-voting 
preferred into voting preferred to give Distributing control of Controlled prior to a spinoff); 
P.L.R. 89-39-015 (June 30, 1989) (same); P.L.R. 89-18-064 (Feb. 7, 1989) (same); P.L.R. 88-48-
045 (Sept. 2, 1988) (recapitalization changing par value of stock so as to issue additional 
shares to give Distributing control of Controlled prior to spinoff); P.L.R. 88-36-046 (June 15, 
1988) (recapitalization into high vote/low vote stock structure); P.L.R. 88-28-065 (Apr. 19, 
1988) (recapitalization into high vote and low vote common stock to give Distributing control 
of Controlled prior to spinoff); P.L.R. 88-12-081 (Dec. 30, 1987) (recapitalization of non-voting 
preferred into voting preferred); P.L.R. 88-03-043 (Oct. 23, 1987) (recapitalization changing 
par value of stock so as to issue additional shares to give Distributing control of Controlled 
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2. Issues Raised by a Recapitalization 
The authorities discussed above demonstrate that the Service 
will respect tax planning techniques that redistribute the voting 
power of a corporation as long as the redistribution results in a 
"permanent realignment of voting control."14° In fact, it appears 
that Revenue Ruling 63-260 provides the only authority for a 
situation in which the Service disregarded an attempt to 
redistribute a corporation's voting power among shareholders as 
transitory and illusory. 14' Nevertheless, a recapitalization or other 
redistribution of the voting power inherent in a corporation's stock 
may be challenged by the Service where: 
(i) the disproportionate voting power of stock is limited by time 
or certain events; 
(ii) the voting power of the stock becomes proportionate upon 
the transfer of such stock; or 
(iii) the voting power of the stock is greatly disproportionate to 
its equity value. 
Each of these situations is discussed below. 
a. Temporary Voting Power 
Where a corporation issues disproportionate voting stock as a 
means of increasing or maintaining the voting power held by a 
particular shareholder, the remaining shareholders may require 
that such disproportionate voting rights be only a temporary 
arrangement. 4' Disproportionate voting stock may be converted 
prior to spinoff); P.L.R. 87-44-035 (Aug. 4, 1987) (recapitalization to give Distributing control 
of Controlled prior to spinoff); G.C.M. 34,795 (Mar. 1, 1972) (issuance of voting preferred to 
give shareholder control prior to spinoff). 
140 Rev. Rul. 69-407, 1969-2 C.B. at 148. 
141 See supranote 129 and accompanying text. 
14 Technically, a majority shareholder of a corporation may be able to effect a 
recapitalization of the corporation without the consent of the other shareholders; however, 
as a practical matter, the majority shareholder will likely seek the approval of the minority 
shareholders in order to prevent the minority shareholders from filing suit against the 
corporation. In order to induce the minority shareholders to approve a recapitalization that 
would reduce their voting power in the corporation, the majority shareholder may be required 
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into proportionate voting stock at a specific time in the future or as 
a result of the occurrence of a subsequent event. 4 3 The Service 
should respect these disproportionate voting rights when such 
rights are not transitory and illusory in nature but "result in a 
permanent realignment of voting control."44 
Although there is no direct authority that defines the term 
"permanent"for these purposes, analogous authorities indicate that 
a disproportionate voting structure that remains in place for five 
years should be considered permanent. In Revenue Ruling 66-23,145 
the Service held that the continuity of interest requirement of 
section 368 was satisfied where shareholders of the target 
corporation were required by an antitrust decree to dispose of stock 
of the acquiring corporation received in a reorganization within 
seven years. The Service concluded that unrestricted ownership for 
such period of time was definite and substantial, notwithstanding 
the requirement to later dispose of the stock. The Service further 
stated that it would ordinarily "treat 5 years of unrestricted rights 
of ownership as a sufficient period for the purpose of satisfying the 
continuity of interest requirements of a reorganization." 46 
Similarly, the Service has held that mandatorily redeemable 
preferred stock issued by an acquiring corporation in a 
to provide the minority shareholders with some form ofcompensation such as a promise by 
the majority shareholder to restore the voting rights of the corporation to proportionate 
voting after a set period of time, an increased equity interest in the recapitalized corporation 
or some combination of the two. For example, in one transaction with which the author is 
familiar, Controlled's majority shareholder exchanged Controlled common stock with a value 
of over $100 million for a new class of Controlled high-vote preferred stock with a liquidation 
preference and redemption amount of $15 million in order to acquire control of Controlled 
prior to a spin-off. Similarly, a recapitalization may be effected by having a corporation's 
minority shareholders exchange each share of common stock owned by them for 1.1 shares 
of a new class of low-vote common stock, thereby providing the majority shareholders with 
a larger percentage of the vote while providing the minority shareholders with a greater 
percentage of the corporation's equity. 
For example, following a recapitalization of a subsidiary's stock into high-vote and low-
vote shares in order to allow the subsidiary's parent to consummate a spin-off or public 
offering, the subsidiary's corporate charter could provide that its high-vote stock will be 
converted into low-vote stock on the earlier to occur of (i) the fifth anniversary of a spin-off 
by the parent of the subsidiary, (ii) the completion ofthe public offering, (iii) the failure of the 
subsidiary to meet certain financial targets, or (iv) the failure of the parent to maintain a 
certain ownership level in the subsidiary. 
" Rev. Rul. 69-407, 1969-2 C.B. at 51. 
141 1966-1 C.B. 67. 
146 Id. at 68. 
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reorganization constituted valid consideration since such stock was 
not redeemable for five years. 
147 
While one could argue that the five-year rule established by 
precedent dealing with the continuity of interest requirement is not 
applicable to determine whether a recapitalization results in a 
permanent realignment of voting control, such precedent is at least, 
by analogy, relevant. Both the continuity of interest requirement 
and the permanence requirement are designed to ensure that a 
shareholder has a real and meaningful interest in a corporation. In 
the case of the continuity of interest requirement, the real and 
meaningful interest is in the economic benefits and burdens of 
ownership of the stock of the corporation. In the case of a 
recapitalization, the permanence requirement focuses on whether 
a shareholder has a real and meaningful ability to influence the 
management of the corporation through the election of directors. 
Since, as discussed previously, voting power is determined by the 
ability to elect the directors of a corporation, five years should be a 
sufficient period of time to allow a shareholder to influence the 
management of the corporation. 148  Moreover, the Service has 
previously respected the disproportionate voting rights of a 
corporation's stock when such rights were to be eliminated after a 
fixed period of time.
1 49 
141 See Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111. 
148 In certain circumstances, disproportionate voting rights that are eliminated after five 
years may not satisfy the permanence requirement. For example, if a corporation had a 
staggered board where directors were elected over a period of seven years, disproportionate 
voting rights that were eliminated after five years would not fully give a shareholder a 
disproportionate ability to elect the board. In practice, however, even corporations that have 
staggered boards elect each member every three years. Thus, a shareholder owning stock 
with five years of disproportionate voting power would have the ability to vote 
disproportionately for each member of the board. 
149 See P.L.R. 95-47-049 (June 2, 1995) (preferred stock with six votes per share was 
redeemable by the issuer after six years); P.L.R. 94-09-043 (Dec. 9, 1993) (stock with three 
votes per share converted into stock with one vote per share automatically after five years); 
P.L.R. 80-34-089 (May 29, 1980) (valid reorganization even though voting stock automatically 
converted into non-voting stock after five years); P.L.R. 80-30-007 (Apr. 14, 1980) (common 
stock with six votes per share was to be automatically converted into common stock with one 
vote per share after six years). 
Since the Service's issuance of a private letter ruling to C. Brewer and Company, Ltd. 
(P.L.R. 94-09-043), officials at the Service have privately expressed their reluctance to issue 
a similar ruling where disproportionate voting rights convert to proportionate voting rights 
for any reason within five years of a spin-off. To that end, tax practitioners have begun to 
structure transactions so that the disproportionate voting rights remain in place for at least 
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Where voting rights are to be readjusted upon the occurrence of 
a future event, the likelihood of the event occurring should be 
assessed to determine whether the disproportionate voting rights 
result in a permanent realignment of voting control. If 
proportionate voting power is restored upon the occurrence of an 
event which is likely to occur in the near future, the 
disproportionate voting power appears to be transitory and illusory. 
If, however, the event that restores proportionate voting power is 
speculative or is not likely to occur for a substantial period of time 
(i.e., five years), the disproportionate voting rights may be deemed 
to result in a permanent realignment of the voting power of the 
corporation. 5 o 
b. NontransferableVoting Power 
Where the ability to disproportionately elect directors is reversed 
by a subsequent transfer of the stock, the disproportionate voting 
rights appear to be transitory and illusory in nature. One may 
argue that such disproportionate voting rights are not an attribute 
of the stock. Where, however, the voting rights are not 
extinguished by transfer of the stock, such voting rights appear to 
be an attribute of the stock and should be respected. 
In Revenue Ruling 78-142, the Service held that a rescission 
provision contained in preferred stock issued in a reorganization 
was not "other property" within the meaning of section 356 of the 
Code because "this provision is inherent in the P preferred stock 
and is not personal to the former T shareholders." 15' The Service 
relied on Revenue Ruling 75-33,152 in which it held that additional 
dividends paid on convertible preferred voting stock issued in a 
reorganization was not other property but was an attribute of the 
stock. The additional dividend right was to be extinguished upon 
conversion of the preferred stock into the company's common stock, 
five years without exception. But see P.L.R. 95-52-023 (Sept. 28, 1995) (where in a ruling 
issued subsequent to P.L.R. 94-09-043, the Service implicitly ruled that the high-vote 
inherent in stock that converted to low-vote stock upon any transfer following a spin-off 
should be respected). 
150 But see supranote 149. 
151 1978-2 C.B. 111, 113. 
, 1975-1 C.B. 115. 
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but would not be extinguished if a shareholder disposed of its 
convertible preferred stock. The Service stated that: 
In order to be considered an attribute of stock, a right to 
dividends must be inseparable from the other rights inherent in 
the stock and not be personal to the shareholders. Since in the 
instant case, the right to receive additional dividends is a right 
inherent in the M stock and is not personal to the former 0 
shareholder such right is an attribute of the M convertible 
preferred stock and does not constitute other property received 
by the former 0 shareholders in exchange for their 0 stock.
1 53 
Two commentators appear to be split on the issue of whether 
disproportionate voting power is permanent and an attribute of the 
stock where such additional voting rights are nontransferable. The 
first has stated that "any stockholder who has voting power that is 
personal to that shareholder (i.e., voting power that does not 
transfer with the shares) ought not to be treated as holding stock 
with voting power."154 Such voting power arguably could be said to 
arise from a shareholders agreement between the shareholder 
receiving the voting rights and the other shareholders of the 
corporation. Since, as previously discussed, a shareholders 
agreement does not have any effect on the characterization of stock 
as voting stock, such an agreement should not affect the voting 
power inherent in a corporation's stock. 55 
The other argues that the Service's concern with transitory and 
illusory recapitalizations, such as in Revenue Ruling 63-260, stems 
from the recapitalization of a subsidiary in advance of a 
distribution of the recapitalized stock "to the very shareholders who 
participate in the recapitalization." 5 ' The recapitalization is 
153 Id. 
"' Todd F. Maynes, Getting Out the Vote: The Use of Voting Rights in Tax Planning,73 
Taxes 813, 827 (1995). However, in a footnote, Maynes states that: 
The opposite view is also arguable. For example, one could argue that stock has voting 
power so long as the shareholder must own the stock in order to exercise the vote. The 
holder's voting power thus arguably is an attribute of the stock even if the voting power 
does not survive transfer of the shares. 
Id. at 827 n.96. 
115See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra. 
156Robert Willens, Strategiesfor DivestingEquity Stakes in a Hostile Tax Environment, 81 
J. Tax'n 88, 93 (1994). 
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transitory and illusory "because the shareholders who purportedly 
ceded voting power to the parent will promptly regain such voting 
power in the ensuing spinoff."'57 The recapitalization in Revenue 
Ruling 69-407, however, resulted in a more permanent realignment 
ofvoting power since it decreased the voting power of shareholders 
ofthe corporation who did not receive stock in the subsequent spin-
off which restored their voting power to the previous level. 5 ' 
Accordingly, even if disproportionate voting power created through 
a recapitalization were to be eliminated upon a subsequent transfer 
of the corporation's stock, the commentator believes that such 
recapitalization should be respected. 
The Service has ruled that the disproportionate voting power of 
a recapitalized corporation should be respected, even though a 
subsequent transfer ofthe recapitalized stock will return the stock's 
original proportionate voting.'59 The first commentator is troubled 
by this result, arguing that the voting rights are personal to the 
taxpayer and not inherent in the stock. 60 The second commentator, 
however, believes that "the prompt conversion of high vote stock to 
low vote stock, addressed in Letter Ruling 9409043, does not 
detract from the permanent realignment of voting control that the 
overall transaction features." 6' This interpretation of Private 
Letter Ruling 94-09-043 now seems questionable in light of the 
Service's own position on this ruling.'62 
The Service's position in Private Letter Ruling 95-47-049 stands 
on firmer ground. There, too, the Service respected 
disproportionate voting stock distributed in a spin-off which 
automatically converted to proportionate voting stock upon a 
subsequent transfer. In that ruling, unlike Private Letter Ruling 
94-09-043, the stock distributed was generally not transferable for 
six years. Moreover, the distributing corporation in Private Letter 
Ruling 95-47-049 represented that it knew of no plan or intention 
on the part ofits shareholders to dispose of the stock received in the 
' Id. at 93. 
158 Id. 
159 See P.L.R. 95-47-049 (June 2, 1995); P.L.R. 94-09-043 (Dec. 9, 1993). 
'6 Maynes, supranote 154, at 827. 
1" Willens, supra note 156, at 93. 
12 See supra note 149. 
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distribution. Because the stock could not generally be transferred 
for six years, the loss of disproportionate voting rights would not 
likely occur for more than five years from the date of the 
distribution. 
In issuing Private Letter Ruling 95-47-049, following its 
statements regarding Private Letter Ruling 94-09-043,163 the 
Service must be relying upon the taxpayer's representation as to its 
shareholders' intentions with respect to the distributed stock. If 
the second commentator is correct that the Service is concerned 
with recapitalizations effectuated in order to allow a transaction to 
occur tax-free and, following such transaction, the voting rights of 
the parties are restored to pre-recapitalization levels, a 
recapitalization should be respected any time it affects the voting 
rights of the shareholders of the corporation where the 
shareholders have no intention of reversing the effects of the 
recapitalization. 
c. Extreme DisproportionBetween Vote and Value 
Some commentators have expressed concern that the Service 
may attempt to disregard disproportionate voting rights where the 
vote-to-value ratio of one class of a corporation's stock is 
significantly different than the vote-to-value ratio of the 
corporation's other classes of stock. One commentator raising this 
concern states that: 
Assuming that there is some limit to the amount by which voting 
power can be cut down in this manner, it would be logical to 
require that the voting power of stock of the acquiring 
corporation given to shareholders of the acquired corporation be 
proportionate to their equity in the acquiring corporation in 
order to qualify as voting stock. Beyond the logic of the situation, 
however, there is neither support for such a rule nor any 
authority indicating what the law in this area may be. 
164 
' See supranote 149. 
' See Richard R. Dailey, The Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations,26 
Tax L. Rev. 725, 737-38 (1971). Dailey bases this statement, in part, on remarks made by 
Senator George in 1936 when the definition of control applicable to the nonrecognition 
provisions of the Code was amended from "ownership of at least 80 per centum of the voting 
stock" to "80 per centum of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to 
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While this argument is logical, there are no cases or rulings in 
which either the courts or the Service have failed to respect the 
voting rights inherent in shares of disproportionate voting stock. 
Moreover, based upon both the administrative and judicial 
precedent respecting disproportionate voting rights, there is no 
foundation for the belief that disproportionate voting rights would 
be disregarded even in the most extreme cases. In Anderson-
ClaytonSecurities, the court held that a taxpayer, which owned 100 
percent of the preferred stock (fifty votes per share) and 64 percent 
of the common stock (one vote per share) of its six subsidiaries, 
could file a consolidated return with the subsidiaries.165 Although 
Anderson-Clayton owned only 64 percent of the common stock, it 
owned stock with 98.56 of the voting power of the subsidiaries.166 
Section 368(c), by its terms, allows for the satisfaction of the 
control requirement through the use of enhanced voting stock. As 
noted previously, Congress has revised the section 1504(a) test for 
affiliation to include both a vote and a value test, thus preventing 
the satisfaction of its requirements merely through the use of 
enhanced voting stock.167 The section 368(c) definition of control 
could similarly be amended if Congress determined that the use of 
enhanced voting stock to satisfy the control requirement of the 
reorganization provisions of the Code presented similar issues. 
Absent such congressional action, the Service should respect the 
use of any enhanced voting stock to satisfy the section 368(c) 
definition of control. 
vote." See section 112(h) of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936. This amendment, according 
to George, was intended to be "declaratory of existing law." See 80 Cong. Rec. 8799 (1936). 
See also Martin D. Ginsburg and Jack S. Levin, Mergers,Acquisitions, and Buyouts 
§ 703.3, at 739 (July 1996) ("[Tjhere may be some concern, particularly in the case of classes 
of common stock, that when the voting power of a class is manifestly out of tune with its 
relative value, IRS will attempt to disregard 'excessive' and 'nominal' voting rights."). 
16 Anderson-Clayton Securities Corporation v. Commissioner,35 B.T.A. 795 (1937). 
166 Id. at 797. 
167 See supra note 11. 
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C. PrivateLetterRuling 94-52-00216 
With the release of Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002,169 the 
Service provided a fresh look into the manner of computing the 
voting power inherent in a corporation's stock that had been 
formulated in Income Tax Ruling 3896 in 1948.17° Although the 
private letter ruling is limited to a discussion of the voting power 
requirement of section 1504(a), the Service's analysis of the law in 
this area directly relates to the determination of control under 
section 368(c)."7' In Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002, the Service 
held that, where the recapitalization of the stock of the subsidiary 
failed to result in the parent owning 80 percent of the subsidiary's 
voting stock, the taxpayer and its parent were not affiliated 
corporations, and thus could not file a consolidated return.172 
" Subsequent to the writing of this article, the Tax Court issued its decision inAlumax, 
Inc. v. Commissioner,109 T.C. No. 8 (Sept. 30, 1997). In this case, the court was presented 
with the same issues upon which (and the same taxpayer to whom) the Service based its 
conclusions in Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002. The court inAlumax sided with the Service 
in holding that the petitioner and its parent were not members of the same affiliated group 
within the meaning of section 1504(a). The court's holding was based upon a rationale 
substantially similar to the one espoused by the Service in Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002. 
"' Aug. 26, 1994. 
70 1948-1 C.B. 72. 
See supra note 13. Furthermore, one commentator has noted that:171 
While affiliation is probably most important with respect to includability in a 
consolidated return, affiliated status is also significant in nonconsolidated contexts (i.e., 
it is required for a valid section 332 liquidation and necessary for deducting 100% of 
qualifying dividends under section 243(b)). Moreover, these developments may have a 
bearing in various non-section 1504 voting power contexts (e.g., with regard to worthless 
security losses under section 165(g)(3) and in determining "control" in reorganization 
transactions under section 368(c)). 
William F. Huber et al., IRS Offers Insighton 80%-of-Voting-Power Test for Affiliated Groups, 
83 J. Tax'n 12 (1995). 
Another commentator states that: 
This is an issue of first impression that has implications beyond section 1504 and the 
ability to file a consolidated return. The message of [P.L.R. 94-52-002] also extends to 
section 351 transfers, liquidations under section 332, "B" and "D" reorganizations, 
section 269 and any other situation in which it is necessary to determine control of a 
corporation through ownership of voting stock. 
KPMG Corporate Tax Update, Vol. 7, No. 1, Apr. 1995. 
The transaction presented to the Service in P.L.R. 94-52-002 arose prior to 1984, when171 
section 1504(a)(2)(B) was added to the Code to require that a corporation also own 80 percent 
of the value of a subsidiary corporation in order to consolidate. Based upon the facts 
presented in the ruling, it does not appear that the value test would have been met through 
the restructuring of the subsidiary. 
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The facts of the ruling are as follows: Corporation V (Parent) 
initially owned all of the Class A common stock of Corporation W 
(Sub). Corporations X, Y and Z (Minority Shareholders) collectively 
owned all of Sub's Class B common stock. Each class of stock had 
the right to elect six of Sub's twelve directors. Pursuant to a plan 
of reorganization (the "Restructuring"), Parent exchanged all of its 
shares of Sub Class A common stock for the same number of shares 
of newly-issued Class C common stock. The structure of Sub's 
board of directors was altered so that after the Restructuring it 
consisted of only eight persons: four Class C directors, each with 
two votes, elected by the Class C shareholder (Parent); two Class B 
directors, each with one vote, elected by the Class B shareholders; 
and two non-voting directors, consisting of the president of Sub and 
an individual jointly chosen by the Class B and Class C 
shareholders. Thus, after the Restructuring, Parent had the ability 
to elect directors who could cast eight of the ten votes on the board 
(80 percent). 
As part of the Restructuring, Sub's charter was also amended in 
three ways. First, a number of matters normally decided by a 
corporation's board of directors through its normal method of voting 
would thereafter require an affirmative vote by a majority of each 
class of Sub's shareholders and/or each class of Sub's directors (the 
"Restricted Matters").'73 Second, Sub was required to pay dividends 
on a quarterly basis on at least 35 percent of its net income. The 
dividends were to be paid 80 percent to the Minority Shareholders 
(the "Dividend Payout"). Finally, Sub's charter was amended to 
include a "call-or-convert" provision that gave the Minority 
Shareholders the right to purchase between 51 percent and 100 
percent of Parent's Class C shares at a price equal to 50 percent of 
the book value of such shares upon the occurrence of certain events 
that jeopardized the Minority Shareholders's investment in Sub 
and the unconditional right to call Parent's Class C shares at any 
...These Restricted Matters were: 
(1) any acquisition or disposition of assets having a value of more than 5 percent of 
Sub's book value; 
(2) any acquisition or disposition of more than 1.8 percent of Sub's assets; 
(3) the selection or dismissal of Sub's chief executive officer; 
(4) any merger involving Sub; and 
(5) any transaction involving Sub and an affiliate of Sub in which Sub made a loan to 
the affiliate or which was not in the ordinary course of business. 
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time after five years. Such right, however, was subject to a prior 
right on the part of Parent to convert its Class C shares back into 
Class A shares. Thus, the "call-or-convert" provision allowed the 
Minority Shareholders to rescind the Restructuring (i) at any time 
if Sub's board attempted to take an action materially adverse to the 
Minority Shareholders' investment or (ii) after five years without 
cause. 
The Service concluded that, based on the facts, Parent lacked the 
control over management required by section 1504(a) and, 
therefore, Parent and Sub were not affiliated during the years at 
issue.174 Even though Parent technically owned stock possessing 80 
percent of the voting power and equity value of Sub, the Service 
stated that "either directly or through their directors, the Class C 
and Class B shareholders continued to own stock possessing with 
respect to those Restricted Matters the same 50/50 voting powers 
after the Restructuring that they had possessed before the 
Restructuring." 
According to the Service, affiliation is premised on "the existence 
of an economic unity between a parent corporation and its 
subsidiaries"175 and "a parent corporation's management control 
over the subsidiary corporation."176 The importance of economic 
unity and management control is displayed by focusing on a 
shareholder's ability to participate in the management of a 
corporation through the election of directors, and not by the ability 
of a shareholder to vote on traditional shareholder matters (e.g., 
mergers and the sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's 
174 Although the taxpayer claimed that the Restructuring was done for "valid business 
purposes," it is clear that the real reason for the Restructuring was to allow Parent and Sub 
to consolidate, thereby allowing Parent's losses to offset Sub's income, producing substantial 
tax savings. 
The Service notes that as part of the Restructuring, Parent and Sub entered into a tax 
sharing agreement, which provided that Sub would pay Parent 90 percent of its federal 
income tax liability, computed as if it were a separate consolidated group. Under this 
agreement, Parent would be paid for its net operating losses on a current basis, instead of 
accruing the losses until the time it had income against which the losses could be offset. The 
benefit to the Minority Shareholders resulted primarily from the Dividend Payout, which 
required that a minimum of 28 percent (35 percent * 80 percent) of Sub's quarterly net 
income would be distributed to them. Moreover, the Minority Shareholders also benefitted 
from Sub's ability to offset its income against Parent's losses. 
Emphasis in original. 
"' Emphasis in original. 
175 
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assets). While the focus is on the ability to elect directors, such 
focus arises from the belief that it is the directors who manage a 
corporation. The Service cited Revenue Ruling 69-126, which 
stated that "participation in the management . . . through the 
election of the board of directors is the criterion of voting power 
.... " The Service noted that Income Tax Ruling 3896 has almost 
identical language. 
While prior case law may have suggested that voting power is 
determined through the use of a mechanical test that looks solely 
at the right to elect directors, the Service pointed out: 
none ofthe cases that measured voting power by reference to the 
election of directors (1) noted the existence of restrictions on the 
board's ability to exercise material board powers or (2) required 
the approval.of material board actions by a majority of the class 
of directors elected by shareholders who were not members ofthe 
affiliated group .... Where the powers of the board of directors 
are restricted to the point that the board cannot exercise 
management control over the corporation without the approval 
of nonmember shareholders (or where the powers of the directors 
selected by group members are limited by the need to obtain the 
approval of the directors selected by nonmember shareholders), 
the right to elect directors is not the exclusive measure by which 
to calculate voting power. 
Once the Service determined that control over management, and 
not a mechanical calculation based upon the ability to elect 
directors, was the proper method for determining affiliation, the 
Service next considered whether the limitations placed on Parent's 
ability to exercise management control over Sub were sufficient to 
defeat Parent's claim of affiliation. The Service concluded that two 
different limitations restricted Parent's control of Sub: (i) the 
requirement that a majority of each class of shareholders approve 
the Restricted Matters and (ii) the requirement that a majority of 
each class of voting directors approve the Restricted Matters. 
Because Parent owned only Sub's Class C common stock, the 
Service concluded that Parent possessed only 50 percent of the 
voting power with respect to Restricted Matters.177 Moreover, the 
...Either of these limitations standing alone would have resulted in the Service rendering 
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Service determined that while the restrictions imposed on Sub's 
board were generally permissible under corporate law, such 
restrictions "prevented the Board from exercising traditional board 
powers with respect to significant matters without the approval of 
the Class B shareholders... and/or the Class B directors." As such, 
the Service ruled that "[Parent] did not possess the power to control 
the management of [Sub] and did not own [Sub] stock possessing 
80% voting power." 
Furthermore, the Service found that both the Dividend Payout 
and call-or-convert provisions of Sub's amended charter placed 
substantial limitations on Parent's control of Sub. With respect to 
the Dividend Payout provision, the Service noted that, although 
such a limitation is legal, it is rarely imposed on a board of 
directors. The Service concluded that "the mandatory dividends 
preference limited [Parent's] control over [Sub] and thus 
undermined [Sub's] purported business purpose for the 
Restructuring." 
The Service also found that the call-or-convert provision limited 
the discretion of the directors in managing Sub's business. The 
call-or-convert provision prevented Parent and Sub from conducting 
their businesses as a "business unit" since Sub's directors were 
prevented from pursuing the best interests of Parent and Sub 
where those interests diverged from the Minority Shareholders' 
interests. 
Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002 reaches the correct result in 
holding that Parent and Sub were not affiliated within the meaning 
of section 1504(a). The taxpayer incorrectly assumed that voting 
power was computed through the use of a mechanical test,178 where 
such a test, in fact, served solely as a shorthand device for the real 
method of computing voting power-determining whether a 
taxpayer has control over the management of the corporation. The 
the same conclusion. 
...It is curious that Parent chose to restructure Sub to give itself the ability to elect 
directors that could cast a "controlling number" of votes on Sub's board instead of giving itself 
the ability to elect more than 80 percent of the number of directors. Under a very literal 
reading of the prior case law and rulings, Parent only had the ability to elect 50 percent of 
the members of Sub's board entitled to vote (4 of the 8 voting members) and 45 percent of all 
of the board members (4.5 of the 10 board members) even after the restructuring and, 
accordingly, Parent's stock contained no more than 50 percent of the voting power in Sub. 
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Service agreed, however, that, in the typical case, measuring voting 
power by reference to the ability to elect directors was proper: 
However, if the parent corporation's management control of the 
company is materially restricted through class voting 
requirements, the parent's election of directors is not an accurate 
measure of voting power. In such a case, the Service may look 
beyond the election of directors to determine more accurately the 
parent's voting power and the parent's ability to control the 
management of the subsidiary. 
Thus, Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002 does not attempt to make 
new law; it simply expands upon prior law.179 
"I Although the Service has primarily used a mechanical test for determining affiliation 
under section 1504(a) and control under section 368(c), determinations of voting power under 
other sections of the Code have employed different tests. In particular, in the foreign context, 
voting power is measured by using a "facts and circumstances test." Treasury Regulation 
section 1.957-1(b) (as amended in 1996) states that: 
In determining for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section whether United States 
shareholders own the requisite percentage of total combined voting power of all classes 
of stock entitled to vote, consideration will be given to all the facts and circumstances 
of each case .... Any arrangement to shift formal voting power away from United 
States shareholders of a foreign corporation will not be given effect if in reality voting 
power is retained. The mere ownership ofstock entitled to vote does not by itself mean 
that the shareholder owning such stock has the voting power ofsuch stock for purposes 
of section 957. For example, if there is any agreement, whether express or implied, that 
any shareholder will not vote his stock or will vote it only in a specified manner, or that 
shareholders owning stock having not more than 50 percent of the total combined voting 
power will exercise voting power normally possessed by a majority of stockholders, then 
the nominal ownership of the voting power will be disregarded in determining which 
shareholders actually hold such voting power, and this determination will be made on 
the basis of such agreement. Moreover, where United States shareholders own shares 
of one or more classes of stock of a foreign corporation which has another class of stock 
outstanding, the voting power ostensibly provided such other class of stock will be 
deemed owned by any person or persons on whose behalf it is exercised or, if not 
exercised, will be disregarded if the percentage of voting power of such other class of 
stock is substantially greater than its proportionate share of the corporate earnings, if 
the facts indicate that the shareholders of such other class of stock do not exercise their 
voting rights independently or fail to exercise such voting rights, and if a principal 
purpose of the arrangement is to avoid the classification of such corporation as a 
controlled foreign corporation under section 957. 
For a discussion ofthe facts and circumstances test developed under section 957, see Kraus 
v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974), affg 59 T.C. 681 (1973); CCA, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,64 T.C. 137 (1975); Estate of Weiskopf v. Commissioner,64 T.C. 78 (1975), 
affd, 538 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1976); Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner,58 T.C. 423 (1972), affd, 489 
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974). 
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D. Conclusion 
Current law provides a good starting point for answering 
questions relating to the computation of voting power. The law 
provides that voting power is generally computed by use of a 
mechanical test that determines what percentage of a corporation's 
board of directors a particular shareholder can elect. However, as 
Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002 points out, such a test provides an 
inexact measurement where a corporation's board of directors is 
restricted in managing the corporation. 
Many of the issues discussed in this article demand further 
attention from either the courts or the Service. For example, it is 
unclear what limitations on the authority of a corporation's board 
of directors are considered so severe that the mechanical voting 
power computation would be inapplicable. The restrictions on the 
board's power in Private Letter Ruling 94-52-002 provide a clear 
example of significant limitations on a board's power to manage a 
corporation; however, the Service should provide guidance as to 
what lesser limitations would affect a shareholder's nominal voting 
control and whether such limitations must have an all-or-nothing 
°effect on the computation of voting power.' The Service could 
provide, for example, a list of safe harbor limitations that a 
corporation could impose on its board of directors (in favor of its 
minority shareholders) without affecting the ability to compute 
voting control through a mechanical computation. 
The Service must also, in light of its comments with respect to 
Private Letter Ruling 94-09-043,"' l provide clarification concerning 
the treatment that should be afforded disproportionate voting 
rights that disappear after the passage of time or upon the 
happening of an event. While disproportionate voting rights that 
survive under all circumstances for a minimum of five years will 
clearly be respected, it is unclear whether an automatic conversion 
" For example, could some lesser restrictions on the management of Sub in Private Letter 
Ruling 94-52-002 have resulted in the Service finding some lesser reduction of the voting 
power inherent in Sub's stock? The author believes that the answer to this question should 
be no. The complexity that would result from taxpayers, the Service and the courts 
attempting to place a value on various aspects of management control would create an 
additional amount of unnecessary controversy. 
...See supra note 149. 
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that could occur before the end of five years should cause the voting 
rights to be considered transitory and illusory. It is also unclear 
whether disproportionate voting rights that revert to proportionate 
voting rights upon the transfer of stock should be considered 
personal to a particular shareholder. Until the Service's position is 
better explained, corporations that recapitalize their stock in order 
to provide a shareholder with control must either be prepared to 
allow such recapitalization to remain in place for five years or to 
seek a private letter ruling from the Service. 
